questions left unconsidered in *No Use*. How would US leadership on the nuclear issue shift the international response to new proliferators, such as North Korea and Iran? Will other nations, be they enemies or allies, simply accept new norms created by the United States? How would a policy of minimum deterrence affect existing US defence commitments in Europe and Asia? Further detail regarding its political viability would enhance Nichols' already strong argument, as would discussion of such a policy's impact on nuclear forces deployed to defend North America.

In the post-Cold War world, nuclear weapons are frequently written off as too morbid to think about; Nichols himself notes that the destruction wrought would be too great to fathom (170–171). Nuclear weapons nevertheless continue to play a predominant role in international relations as more nations pursue nuclear programs. In *No Use*, Nichols offers a concise and illuminating overview of US nuclear thinking from Hiroshima to the present. He calls into question Cold War-era orthodoxies regarding nuclear deterrence, challenging the reader to consider the implications and logistics of contemporary nuclear policy. He synthesizes key perspectives on nuclear weapons from government officials, political scientists, and historians in a manner that is both sophisticated and unencumbered by jargon. Throughout, Nichols provokes his readers to consider the intricacies of US nuclear policy, its roots, and its future in an increasingly complex international system.

T.V. Paul
The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 253 pp., $27.95 (cloth)
ISBN: 978–0–19–932223–7

Reviewed by: Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, University of Victoria

Although the title *The Warrior State* might seem shocking to some, this book is a brilliant and penetrating analysis of an important region of South Asia, a region that has failed to generate a democratic political structure during the past six decades and whose external strategy of continually pursuing war with India has diminished rather than enhanced its state capacity. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan's political history has been marred by intra-state and inter-state conflicts and the decay of its political institutions. The military has played a dominant role in determining the country's internal as well as external affairs. While many had hopes of a new beginning for the country in 2013 when, for the first time in its political history, Pakistan witnessed the transfer of power from one elected democratic government to another, this wishful thinking has been shattered by anti-government protests by two opposition groups, one led by the Sufi cleric Tahir-ul-Quadri and the other by charismatic cricket-star-turned-politician Imran Khan, who credited Nawaz Sharif's victory to electoral fraud. Some suggest that the military is behind Quadri and Khan's campaign. Internal security remains in jeopardy. Armed Taliban and their foreign allies roam freely in Waziristan and

other neighbouring territories. Pakistan's military is still using militant groups as proxies to control Afghanistan and destabilize India. In 2013 Pakistan violated the line of control with India approximately 200 times and did so again about 60 times in the first half of 2014.

T.V. Paul approaches these issues head on and provides a cogent and lucid analysis of Pakistan as a failing state. While the book is a must read for anyone interested in South Asia and Pakistan's development (or lack of it), it also makes an important contribution to the political science literature on state-making and nation-building. This study of Pakistan suggests that the European example of state-building and war-making is both historically and contextually constrained and cannot be easily transplanted to developing countries' experiences. T.V. Paul expands his analysis by asking whether Pakistan's case is atypical in the developing world and comparing Pakistan to other Muslim states, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia, where the military has dominated, as well as non-Muslim states such as Korea and Taiwan.

T.V. Paul's analysis of the role of war and war-making in the development of the Pakistani nation-state in the twentieth century is built on the following four causal factors. First, Pakistan's dominant elite share the ideological world view of creating a strong national-security state based on military might and where Islam plays a crucial role in defining Pakistani identity. Second, the warrior state strategy is the result of a combination of ideas, circumstances, motives, and opportunities that have provided a guiding framework to the Pakistani elite. The Pakistani elite's warrior state ideal and military-first approach—strike first and military force to recover territory—is a product of the elite's "Hobbesian worldview with a religious coloration" (24). Third, the geostrategic location of the country has facilitated the pursuance of this hyper-national security agenda by the elites, as Pakistan continually seeks power symmetry with India, with the resulting consequences of an enduring rivalry between the two countries, a shifting of resources to war-making, and an unholy alliance with Islamic militant groups. Fourth, its location has placed a geostrategic curse on Pakistan. The country's significance in the strategic power contest has allowed it to benefit from vast amounts of foreign assistance, taking away any impetus for those in power to pay attention to the country's internal needs, including the requirement of seeking legitimacy from its own population. The results of this curse have been a poor economy, inter-state and intra-state conflict, and a precarious relationship between the military and the civilian government.

After walking us through Pakistan's tempestuous history over the past 66 years, the author focuses on the warrior state in chapters 4 to 6—"The Garrison State," "The Geostrategic Urge," and "Religion and Politics." The origin and persistence of Pakistan as a garrison-state, punctuated by hybrid democratic governments but with the military maintaining dominant control, has resulted from a set of mutually reinforcing conditions: the security imperative used by the military to rationalize its dominance over Pakistani politics; the institutionalization of the military in the bureaucratic and power structure and its entrenchment in the economy; the

historical-cultural legacy of the superiority of martial races and traditions; the weaknesses of democratic institutions, such as political parties and civilian political leaders, that could challenge the military; and the support by the middle classes of the military's world view of security first and the existential threat posed by India. Consequently, the garrison-state becomes obsessed with the excessive militarization of society, where it uses any opportunity "to focus on other states' capabilities . . . to assess threats" and "use threat to promote threats" (91). A garrison-state is also a dysfunctional learner whose prevailing belief is that military "defeats are caused by the treachery of the opponent" and "the next time they just have to try harder in order to win" (91).

This holds true so far as India and Pakistan are concerned. Even the civilian leaders of the hybrid democratic periods, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, did not shy away from the goals of the garrison-state but enhanced its military-first policies, particularly in seeking strategic parity with India. Given its geopolitical location, great powers such as the United States and China have helped Pakistan in its quest for parity. As a result, the military elite has overestimated its power potential. Moreover, the geostrategic advantage has turned into a curse for Pakistan as the elites have strayed away from the goals of "seeking more benign alternative security strategies or development paths to greater economic prosperity" (126).

The book concludes with a note of caution. The only hope for Pakistan's transformation rests on the conditions that "both its strategic circumstances and the ideas and assumptions that the elite hold change fundamentally" and a tolerant and liberal civil society emerges (198).

James Graham Wilson
The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War
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Few presidents have left as complicated and politically charged a legacy as Ronald Reagan. Partisan pundits have played a preponderant role in shaping Reagan's legacy, some hailing him as a master strategist and others reviling him as a simpleton and supporter of dictators. Gradually, however, a limited body of so-called "Reagan revisionism" has begun to emerge. Historians and political scientists, writing with the benefit of temporal distance from the 1980s and increased access to sources in the United States and around the world, have begun to produce accounts of the Reagan administration's foreign and domestic policy successes and failures in a balanced, apolitical manner.

James Graham Wilson's *The Triumph of Improvisation* is an important contribution to this body of historiography. Wilson, a historian at the US Department of