Under Pressure? Globalisation and the National Security State

T.V. Paul and Norrin M. Ripsman

A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this article, we investigate the impact of globalization on four core areas in which globalization scholars contend that the national security function of states has been affected: 1) the frequency of interstate wars; 2) the level of global military spending and the size of armed forces worldwide; 3) the participation of multilateral security providing institutions and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in international security activities; and, 4) the challenge of global terrorism. Our analysis reveals that most of the globalization theorists’ expectations about the worldwide pursuit of national security remain unfulfilled. There is no major evidence of a decline in global military spending, a reduction in armed forces worldwide or an increasing reliance on international institutions or INGOs to foster security in the contemporary era. Moreover, those changes that are evident — such as an apparent reduction in interstate warfare — cannot be attributed with confidence to the phenomenon of globalization, rather than to other geopolitical factors, such as the end of the Cold War and the entrenchment of American hegemony. Thus, while globalization may transform the pursuit of security in the future, there is no evidence that it has done so profoundly to-date.

A growing body of scholarly writings argues that globalisation has weakened the national security state. Some hold that, as national security has been the core function and chief rationale for the existence of the nation-state, the nation-state itself is on the wane.¹ From their

advent in the 16th century as modern states, until the mid-20th century, European states waged relentless warfare in order to pursue their interests, both territorial and economic. They became strong largely due to this security competition, as it enabled them simultaneously to extract resources and command loyalty from their population. State-building and war-making went hand in hand. The Cold War conflict (1950-1991) extended the role of the state as the key security provider globally. Because of the global competition for power and influence and the enormity of the destructive forces arrayed against each other, states had to assume an ever-vigilant position. With the arrival of the unprecedented forces of globalisation, especially after the end of the Cold War, this role of the state as security provider is said to be on the decline. Furthermore, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, arguments have emerged that the territorially-organised state with traditional military instruments has proved to be incapable of facing the threats posed by transnational terrorism, created by extremist ideologies and propagated through global networks.2

In this article, we investigate the impact of globalisation on the pursuit of security in the contemporary era. In particular, we examine four core areas where diverse globalisation theorists claim that globalisation has affected security practices. These are: 1) the frequency of interstate wars; 2) the level of global military spending and the size of armed forces worldwide; 3) the participation of multilateral security providing institutions and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in international security activities; and, 4) the challenge of global terrorism. We consider the extent to which changes have, indeed, occurred in these areas and whether these changes represent a significant departure from the pursuit of security in previous eras. In addition, we consider whether any of the changes we find in security behaviour have been brought about by globalisation or whether they are the result of other aspects of the contemporary international system. Finally, we explore whether any changes that have occurred appear to be permanent, or merely transient.

Our investigation of the claims of the diverse globalisation literature reveals that most of the globalisation school’s expectations


3. While we use the shorthand ‘the globalisation school’ for the group of arguments we are testing, it is important to note that this represents a composite
Under Pressure?

about the worldwide pursuit of national security remain unfulfilled. In particular, there is no evidence of a decline in global military spending, a reduction in armed forces worldwide or an increasing reliance on multilateral security institutions or INGOs to foster security in the contemporary era. Moreover, we find that those changes over the last decade-and-a-half that are evident —such as an apparent reduction in interstate warfare—cannot be attributed with confidence to the phenomenon of globalisation rather than to other geopolitical factors, such as the end of the Cold War and the entrenchment of American hegemony. Thus, while it is possible that globalisation may transform the pursuit of security in the future, there is no evidence that it has done so to date in a profound way.

The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. In the first of these, we outline the understanding of ‘globalisation’ that underlies our investigation. The second section presents the range of arguments advanced by a diverse group of theorists united by their contention that aspects of what we define as globalisation affect the dynamics of international security. In the third section, we examine four core areas in which the changes in security behaviour of states these arguments propose should be evident: 1) inter-state and intra-state wars; 2) military spending and the size of armed forces; 3) the role of

of a variety of different and often competing arguments that are related only in that they explore the effects of the phenomenon of globalisation on the pursuit of national security. We feel it is useful to cull out and investigate a set of core propositions flowing from this school in much the same way that International Relations (IR) scholars have done with disparate neorealist arguments (united by their emphasis on the impact of international anarchy on international politics) and liberal arguments (united by their emphasis on the impact of individuals and institutions on international politics). See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-553. However, we acknowledge the diversity of the literature in this area and the contending views it has generated among enthusiasts and opponents.

4. This article is part of a broader research project on the impact of globalisation on international security. Our purpose here is to investigate the macro-level claims of the impact of globalisation on global behavior in the security theater. We investigate the impact of globalisation on the national security policies of specific countries and in different regions elsewhere. See Norrin M. Rippsman and T.V. Paul, ‘Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis’, International Studies Review 7, no. 1 (March 2005), forthcoming.

357
international institutions and non-state actors; and 4) transnational terrorism. We conclude by looking at somewhat similar past predictions of changes in the security role of states and the limited actual realisation of those changes.

What is Globalisation?

Globalisation is a frequently-used buzzword in contemporary political discourse, but it is rarely employed with precision and appears to mean different things to different people. As Axel Hülsemeyer has observed, the Political Science literature is replete with economic, political, social, and cultural definitions of globalisation that focus on very different, although related, phenomena. Economic definitions of globalisation denote an expansion of the scale of economic activity beyond the nation-state. In a globalised world, economic management, decision-making, production, distribution, and marketing are organised on a global scale, which limits the nation-state’s ability to regulate economic activity and makes national welfare heavily dependent on the international market. Thus, economic globalisation essentially comprises the two related phenomena of heightened economic interdependence and transnationalism. The former refers to an interconnectedness of the world economy such that a change in the economic conditions in one country would bring about changes in the economy of others; or, more drastically, a disruption of normal economic relations would impose...
costs upon multiple states. The latter refers to the increased ease with which goods, services, and business entities can cross national boundaries due to revolutionary advances in communication and transportation technologies.

Political definitions of globalisation emphasize the actions states have taken to adapt to the new global economic environment and, in particular, the decline of the welfare providing and income redistribution components of the state. Social definitions of globalisation focus on the social impact, at both the local and global levels, of the distribution of gains and losses that economic globalisation entails. Thus, it is widely understood that globalisation has had a profound effect of widening income disparities and exacerbating the North-South divide. Finally, cultural definitions of globalisation focus on the degree to which cultural identities increase in scale as people shift their allegiance from national or subnational units to supranational ones.

We argue that, if we are to employ the term ‘globalisation’ meaningfully as a causal variable, we must conceptually distinguish it from its effects. Therefore, it is not useful to conflate the phenomenon of globalisation with the reactions of states or non-state actors to it, as some of the above approaches do. In our view, what all of these images of globalisation share is a concern with the expansion of socio-economic and socio-political activities beyond the boundaries of the state to an international and transnational scale. Thus, for us, globalisation entails


the operation of businesses on a global, rather than a national level; the ease with which individuals and groups can communicate and organise across national frontiers; the global transmission of ideas, norms, and values that might erode national cultures in favour of a broader global culture; the increasing participation of states in international political, economic and military organisations; the spread of particular forms of political institutions, such as representative democracy, to vast areas of the globe; and the increasing participation of individuals from multiple countries in INGOs. Globalisation, therefore, is a vast, multi-faceted enterprise.

In the next section, we shall explore a variety of disparate arguments about the conduct of national security in the contemporary era that are united by their emphasis on facets of what we identify as globalisation.

Varieties of Theses on Globalisation and National Security

Globalisation theorists have advanced different positions regarding the national security function of contemporary states. To some ‘hard’ globalisation proponents, globalisation has already ushered in drastic changes to all of the state’s functions, including the security role. Ardent proponents, like Kenichi Ohmae have contended that, under the irreversible influence of modern information technology, genuinely borderless economies are emerging, affecting business behaviour and the values, judgements and preferences of citizens all over the world. Other ‘hard globalisation proponents have argued that, under the weight of global social forces, the individual citizen’s loyalty to the state has declined and will decline further in the future. States are left without war as a mechanism to foster national loyalty and patriotism, and there is nothing in sight with an equivalent ability to generate the binding glue that this social institution provided nation-states for centuries. Thus, the ‘hard’ globalisation proponents expect that globalisation is in the process of replacing the state with global institutions that are more appropriate for coping with global challenges.

13. In this regard, we reject the argument that globalisation can be conflated with Americanisation. After all, while the US may have been one of the driving forces behind the spread of markets and Western institutions beyond national borders, it is not in the driver’s seat of globalisation. Indeed, as the Seattle WTO protests, the international pressure that compelled the US to end its steel tariffs, and other incidents indicate, it too is subject to the pressures of globalisation.


‘Soft’ globalisation proponents, conversely, argue that changes have been taking place incrementally, yet in significant measure. To them, states are increasingly reluctant to use military instruments to resolve inter-state problems, partially due to the growing desire for wealth acquisition through economic liberalization and trade. The norm of territorial integrity has become entrenched, making it virtually impossible for states to alter borders by force and receive international recognition. The dramatic decline of inter-state wars since the end of the Cold War in 1991 is seen as proof that the activities surrounding war-making are no longer the primary focus of states; even major powers (barring the US, perhaps) are conducting their limited competition though ‘soft geopolitics’, with less emphasis on open arms races, crises, and war. In the ‘soft’ globalization view, major security threats no longer consist primarily of military challenges, but take the form of terrorism, drug trafficking, disease, ecological disasters, and mass poverty. These theorists note that notions of ‘human security’, as opposed to military security, increasingly affect the preferences of policy-makers in many countries. With the decline of geopolitical conflicts, they argue that the military in most advanced states has become more focused on internal and international crime fighting or policing as opposed to waging inter-state wars.


Millennium

Some globalisation scholars in the commercial liberal tradition argue that states are unwilling and unable to fight large-scale wars due to the deepening of economic interactions among states and multinational corporations.21 These scholars argue that when trade flows freely across national borders and multinationals become more transnational—i.e., producing and assembling different components in different countries—the states that host them prefer to avoid military confrontations, as they would suffer heavily in economic terms if war were to break out.22 Some even contend that for many developed economies land is no longer a consideration in relation to security. For instance, Richard Rosecrance has conceptualized the rise of ‘virtual states’, maintaining that where ‘capital, labour and information are mobile and have risen to predominance, no land fetish remains’.23 Etel Solingen has gone a step further, arguing that the economic liberalisation that has been taking place globally since the early 1990s has led economically and politically liberalising elites to undermine the power of their military establishments deliberately, so as to attract foreign capital and preserve market access.24

Within our view of globalisation, we can also identify democratic peace arguments as globalisation theses, concerned as they are with the spread of democratic institutions worldwide. To democratic peace theorists, the widespread democratization of countries in most regions of the world has diminished the propensity of democratic states to wage war against one another. They argue that democracies rarely fight each

other, as they deliberately play down military threats for both institutional and normative reasons. As Russett contends, democratic institutions restrain democratic states from using military force against other democracies in times of crises, as they externalise their domestic political norms of tolerance and compromise in their foreign relations with similar political systems.25

A fifth set of globalisation-related arguments is put forward by normative schools, which believe that several global norms have emerged in recent decades which have considerable influence on state behaviour in the security arena. These norms can both constrain states from certain security behaviour (e.g., the deployment of particular weapons) and compel them to use their military power in non-traditional ways (e.g., to participate in humanitarian relief efforts). State sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and the acquisition and use of certain weapons, such as land mines, are areas, which have been affected by these norms. International human rights norms have especially been cited as affecting the behaviour of states vis-a-vis their citizens.26 Norms against war crimes and genocide, although broken in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, have become focal points in an emerging normative international framework with the arrest and prosecution of some leaders who perpetrated such crimes. The recently established International Criminal Court further augments this position. The increasing presence of norms in the security arena suggests, it is argued, that a nascent global normative order has emerged which challenges the traditional state-centric military security approach of states.27

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist strikes on the US, a sixth line of globalisation arguments has emerged which contends that transnational terrorism has paralyzed the state’s ability to protect its citizens. Indeed, even the most sophisticated military power in the world


Millennium was not able to prevent a major assault on its financial and military nerve-centres by a highly organised group of individuals of various nationalities using unsophisticated weapons. Moreover, no effective countermeasures have since been found to combat the scourge of terrorism. The conventional attacks on states that harbour and sponsor terrorism, such as Afghanistan, have achieved only limited success, as terrorists can flee to other countries. Thus terrorists have effectively used the transportation and communication networks that are the hallmarks of globalisation to mount a formidable challenge to the state.28

Four Core Arguments on Globalisation and State Security

Although there is no single integrated theory of globalisation, as the preceding discussion shows, nearly all versions of it focus on the weakening of the nation-state as the primary unit of international politics, and on the decreasing importance of military security in determining states’ behaviour and national policies. If the core arguments on the state’s security function that are present in most globalisation theses are valid, then changes should be visible in four core areas on a global scale.29

First, if the theses were correct, there would be a major decline in interstate armed-conflicts world-wide. This would occur because of the spread of relatively cheap destructive weapons technology across the globe would paradoxically make the use of force to counter threats far more costly and so encourage restraint. In addition, increasing challenges from sub-state and non-state actors in a globalised world should shift the state’s focus from interstate warfare to ‘wars of a third kind’30. Second, an increasing number of states would drastically reduce their military forces and substantially cut military expenditures, since increasing scales of destruction and the decreasing frequency of interstate wars should encourage states to pursue cheaper deterrent strategies, rather than expensive war-fighting doctrines.31 Third, states would increasingly rely on international and regional institutions for


29. For an analysis of additional propositions of the globalisation literature, see Ripsman and Paul, ‘Globalization and the National Security State’.


31. van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, 352-353.
their security while reducing their emphasis on national military forces, as multilateral approaches would be more cost-efficient and better-suited to countering transnational challenges. They would also reach out to non-governmental organisations and private military companies (PMCs) to assist them in the provision of security. Finally, the advent of transnational terrorism would increasingly paralyze the state’s ability to provide security to its citizens, as, with ever more porous borders, states cannot easily prevent terrorists from recruiting and organising across the globe or transporting hazardous materials, money, or weapons across national borders. By examining these four key areas, we will assess the extent to which changes have taken place, whether these changes are caused by globalisation, and whether they are sustainable or not.

**Inter-State Wars**

A key measurable argument of the thesis that globalisation leads to the decline of the national security state, pertains to the decline in the amount of inter-state wars in the international system. On this measure there is some supporting evidence, since there has in fact been a considerable decline in inter-state wars since the Cold War. In 1991, fifty-one states, representing 33 percent of all independent countries, were engaged in some form of serious conflict, many of which were interstate wars. By 1999, this total had declined by half, both in the number of cases and the percentage of involved states, indicating a preponderance of intra-state wars. Indeed, only two of the 25 conflicts (involving 23 countries) with 1000 or more battlefield deaths in 2000 were interstate conflicts. This decline continued in 2001 when 24 armed conflicts occurred in 22 locations and 2002 when 21 armed conflicts raged in 19 locations. Most of the worldwide conflict is manifested in civil wars, terrorism, and political violence—i.e., intra-state conflicts—

34. Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, 394-408.
even when more than one state is involved in these conflicts. Thus states seem to be less willing than in the past to resort to military force to resolve international disputes.

The problem that arises, however, is assessing the exact cause for the decline in inter-state wars. Economic globalisation may be a factor, but it is unclear whether it is the primary cause. Changes in values, ideas and norms, particularly the anti-imperial norm, and the mitigating role of international institutions have also been characterized as explanatory variables for the absence of major war, giving further credibility to the globalisation thesis. Other factors, though, could be the end of the Cold War, the preponderance of American power and the consequent transformation of the international system to near unipolarity, the increasing number of democratically-oriented states, and, above all, the technological changes that obstruct offence and support defence and/or deterrence. It would take an enormous amount of careful research to make any meaningful claim as to which factor is most significant in this regard.

A related question that needs to be answered is: if states are not fighting wars to settle disputes, to what alternative strategies are they resorting? According to the globalisation thesis, an increasing number of states are relying on economic and other soft power approaches to security, as opposed to military instruments. Under this logic, there would be a decrease in the use of coercive military force and, in its place, an increase in economic sanctions and other non-violent coercive sanctions. For a period at least, economic sanctions did in fact become the preferred alternative to warfare against states that, like Iraq and Yugoslavia, defied the will of the United States. And the global use of economic sanctions as a policy alternative has increased markedly in the

last decade or so. It is not clear, however, that economic sanctions have
replaced war, as some of these sanctions were imposed either just before
or following intense military campaigns, as was the case with both Iraq
and Yugoslavia. Moreover, there is considerable debate about whether
economic sanctions work or not. Robert Pape, for example, argues that
except in restricted situations where the target is a very weak, dependent
or vulnerable state (such as Indian sanctions against Nepal in 1990), and
the demands were trivial (such as threatened Arab sanctions against
Canada in 1979), economic sanctions have rarely been effective in forcing
changes to the foreign or security policies of states and therefore are not
a reliable alternative to the use of military force.

There is, however, some evidence that economic calculations may
sometimes help alter state security policies. For example, New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman has argued that in the summer of 2002 India
chose not to attack Pakistani camps training militants to launch
incursions into Indian Kashmir because of the pressures exerted by the
computer software industry—a major source of India’s economic
growth—which led Delhi to fear that its economy would suffer
incalculable harm if a war were to break out in the region. And yet, even
in this case the Indian escalation options were limited by Pakistan’s
possession of nuclear weapons and the US diplomatic and military
involvement in the region.

To sum up, then, the recent decline in inter-state wars is a major
development in world politics. However, the connection of this trend
with globalisation is not fully apparent as a myriad of factors may be
causing this transformation.

41. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara L. Oegg, for example, document 51
applications of economic sanctions in the decade from 1990 to 1999, a 50%
increase from the 34 episodes of the 1980s. UN sanctions have increased as well,
with 11 documented cases, compared to only two from 1970-1989. ‘Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered—Again: Trends in Sanctions Policy in the 1990s’, paper
On the increasing use of UN sanctions, see also George A. Lopez and David
Cortright, with Julia Wagler, ‘Learning from the Sanctions Decade’, 2000
Security 22, no.2 (1997): 90-136. For a more nuanced view, see Jean-Marc F.
Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, ‘Asking the Right Question: When
43. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘India, Pakistan and GE’, [www.nytimes.com/
2002/08/11/opinion] (December 17, 2002).
Another core proposition of globalisation theorists is that military spending should decline considerably under the pressures of economic globalisation and economic liberalization. There was, indeed, a major decline in military spending from 1988 to 1996, when world military expenditures decreased by over 30 percent from $1.066 trillion to $708 billion (in constant 1995 dollars and exchange rates). However, by 1999 world military expenditures had begun to increase again. In 2000, world defence spending increased by 5 percent, to $798 billion in 2001 dollar prices. In 2001, that figure would increase by another 5 percent to about $839 billion. It would be very difficult to prove that the earlier short-term decline happened due to globalisation. In fact, it seems much more likely that the immediate cause of this change was the end of the Cold War, which was akin to the end of a major war, which meant that states no longer needed to compete at the intense Cold War level. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent economic decline of Russia took away a substantial portion of the total global spending on military. The number of proxy wars supported by the superpowers also declined, resulting in fewer weapon transfers to competing groups. Moreover, if globalisation were the key inhibiting factor on arms spending, what would explain the increase in military spending since 1999, even before the 2001 terrorist attacks?

As the American example indicates, even states that are heavily tied to the global economy have begun to increase their defence expenditures. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist strikes, the US has increased its defence spending substantially. Under the five year defence spending plan adopted in 2002, the US has allocated 2.1 trillion dollars on defence over five years and, indeed, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that in the current defence environment US defence spending...
will rise about 25 percent in the next decade, from an estimated $452 billion in 2004 to $564 billion in 2014. The other Western countries and those affected by terrorism are also expected to increase their spending in the years to come.

Global arms sales data provides another useful resource in assessing the impact of global forces on the state’s security function. A Congressional Research Service study published in August 2001 reported that, during 2000, international arms sales grew by 8 percent to $36.9 billion, with the US responsible for nearly half ($18.6 billion) of all arms sold on the global market. The key sellers, after the US, are: Russia ($7.7 billion), France ($4.1 billion), Germany ($1.1 billion), Britain ($600 million), China ($400 million), and Italy ($100 million). The major buyers have been developing states. Thus, states continue to maintain large defence budgets and appear to be spending large amounts on military hardware to perpetuate their traditional national security roles, although they are increasingly relying on the global market to access military goods. While globalisation may have spelled the end of autarky as a means of pursuing security, therefore, it has not heralded the end of traditional national security establishments themselves.

*International Institutions and Transnational Actors*

According to globalisation theorists, in a globalised world states should increase reliance on international institutions and non-governmental organisations to advance their security interests. We thus consider, in turn, the degree to which states have involved multilateral international institutions, INGOs and PMCs in their security efforts.


Millennium

International institutions did seem to have gained prominence in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, as there has been a mushrooming of institutions at both the regional and global levels. These institutions—especially the UN, when the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) have been in agreement—have played a pivotal role in peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Clearly there has been a limited increase in involvement by the UN in regional conflict theatres. However, despite this apparent surge in IGO activities, the power of the United States was necessary for the international institutions to intervene in conflict theatres like the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and East Timor, and even in humanitarian interventions in places like Somalia and Haiti. At the same time, many of the UN-led operations have been insufficient to handle the tasks, have not been fully funded, or, worst of all, have been selective. In almost all the UN interventions, power politics and security considerations of the P-5 were crucial. The US has used these institutions for its own interventions, most specifically in Iraq in 1991 and Yugoslavia. Although the US warmed up to the UN after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the UN has not been a key player in the war against terrorism initiated by Washington. In 2003, after failing to gain support from the UN Security Council for its military operations against Iraq, the US simply ignored it. And, in spite of efforts by countries such as France and Russia to constrain US unilateralism though their veto power, the UN Security Council is likely to be further marginalized in the future as US power and interests diverge ever more substantially from other states, including US allies.

Thus, recent events have not disproved the realist assertion that international institutions are merely reflections of great power politics and possess no supranational authority or enforcement capability independently of the great powers. At the beginning of the 21st century,

51. From 1996-2002, international organisations organised an average of over fifty peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions per year, with the UN responsible for almost half of them. See the 1997-2003 editions of the SIPRI Yearbook. For a critical discussion of these UN missions, see David M. Malone and Karin Wermester, ‘Boom or Bust? The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (2000): 37-54.


the hope that international institutions could supplant national security establishments remains, at best, an unfulfilled dream. Regional security organisations, such as NATO, the Organisation of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and African Unity, also seek to provide security to members within a multilateral framework. Since 1997, regional organisations have participated in peacekeeping operations even more frequently than the UN has. In 1997, the UN coordinated 25 missions compared to 29 by regional security organisations. The difference was most striking in 2001, when regional security organisations coordinated 32 operations to the UN’s 19—almost 70 percent more. In addition, the 1999 intervention in Kosovo was conducted under NATO’s auspices, as was the 2001 war against Afghanistan. Nonetheless, there is reason to doubt the degree to which states rely on these institutions. After all, while the US used NATO as a multilateral fig leaf for its operation against Afghanistan, it did not hesitate to embark on the 2003 campaign against Iraq when it determined that NATO (and the UN) was not inclined to act in accordance with American national interests. And in Europe, although the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was hyped as a foundation for security after the Cold War, it too has fallen by the wayside, being replaced by institutions such as NATO and the EU that are more dependent on the great powers. Thus, it is by no means clear that states have decided to pursue security within multilateral institutions, rather than through state-centered means.

If the globalisation thesis is correct, INGOs should also be competing with states as security providers on an almost equal footing in key areas in which they specialize. The record, though, is mixed. Certainly, the number of transnational advocacy networks in the international arena has multiplied: from 110 in 1953 to 631 in 1993; with even more being formed in the last decade in issue areas such as human rights, world order, women’s rights, development and peace. In the security arena, some non-state actors have been successful in motivating states to conclude security treaties, albeit on a limited scale. An important example is the Global Land Mines Treaty, which was largely the result of efforts by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, uniting over one thousand NGOs in fifty-five countries. This effort, however, failed...
Millennium

to get the US or other key producers of the weapons—such as Russia, China, and India—on board. INGOs have also been active at global conferences, both as critics and occasionally as participants. Some INGOs have been key players in helping to provide humanitarian aid in war-torn areas, often in association with UN agencies. Despite their increased presence, however, INGOs’ influence has been confined to a few specific security issues, and is, therefore, at best episodic. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era there has been very little INGO interest or participation in core security issues involving the major powers—e.g., nuclear arms control (barring the conferences that led to the NPT extension and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]), the Chemical Weapons Convention, NATO’s eastward expansion, national and theatre missile defence, and the increasing militarization of space.59 Moreover, having a say in a specific security issue is not the same as challenging the state on a whole host of security issues in which the state and the state alone has the upper hand. As Hoffmann remarks, the international civil society remains ‘embryonic’. It represents a small segment of the population from mostly advanced states, and often possesses only limited independence from governments.60

PMCs have also grown in number and prominence since the end of the Cold War. Many states have contracted out defence services to such companies. For instance, the Pentagon has outsourced many ancillary operations to PMCs—such as data gathering, processing and monitoring—in addition to limited combat operations and the protection of commanders and political leaders, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several weak states in Africa depend on these private forces for the protection of the country and the rulers themselves. And yet, although there is evidence of the increasing role of PMCs in many parts of the world, they are not fundamentally a new phenomenon. Mercenaries, in the form of contracted units, military entrepreneurs, and charter companies, have always existed side by side with regular armed forces. In the contemporary era, they tend to be more prominent during the mass military demobilisations characteristic of periods of systemic transitions, and in weaker states with limited capabilities.61 However, these PMCs are largely paid and deployed by states and can thus be

59. In the arms control and disarmament area, INGOs, especially peace movements, were perhaps more effective during the latter stages of the Cold War—i.e. during the Reagan and Gorbachev years. During the conferences that led to the NPT extension and the CTBT, INGOs were present as observers or as aides to national delegations; without their active interest and lobbying efforts, these treaties would not have been concluded.
characterized as extensions of the state. Moreover, their use remains limited, with the lion’s share of the great powers’ national security programs being carried out by traditional instruments of the national security state. The outsourcing of some security functions by some states to PMCs does not, therefore, mean that states have fundamentally reduced their role as security providers.

Given the evidence, it would be difficult to conclude that multilateral security providing institutions, INGOs and PMCs have supplanted—or even greatly diminished—the role of the state in the security area. Instead, while these organisations increasingly attempt to intervene in the provision of security, they are too heavily dependent on powerful states to have any real independent impact.

Transnational Terrorism as a Challenge to the State’s Security Role

In recent years, the most powerful challenge to the nation-state has been mounted by transnational terrorism. The September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US dramatically highlighted several weaknesses of state-centric security policy-making throughout the world and bloodied the traditional notions of war as a struggle between states as organised political entities. The fact that terrorists are transnationally organised and use modern communication systems (a major source of globalisation) makes it difficult for the nation-state to provide security in the modern world, according to globalisation theorists. Moreover, small terrorist groups are able to amass immense destructive power, formerly the ‘monopoly of states’, and thereby undercut the primacy of states in the security area.

The national security state has thus far been unprepared to fight terrorism because, since it is states that have traditionally posed the major security challenges vis-à-vis one another, states’ defence policies have been very much state-centric. Most states have structured their military forces and operational plans on Clausewitzian rational assumptions. The four foundations of defence strategy—offence, defence, deterrence, compellence—all assume that the opponent is a rational actor who would make cost/benefit calculations and would not engage in war if the costs of attacking are higher than the payoffs.

The war on terrorism demonstrates that the terrorist adversary does not hold the same Clausewitzian rationality assumptions.

63. See, for example, van Creveld, The Rise and Demise of the State, esp. 394-408.
Deterrence does not work with sub-state actors of this nature, because the terrorist may be prepared to die for the particular ideological cause that he/she publicizes in committing the terrorist act. Similarly, massive retaliatory strikes on the state or the population that supports terrorism might simply make the terrorists’ cause gain an even wider appeal among hitherto ideological fence-sitters. Moreover, such retaliation may not even touch the actual centre of gravity or focal point of terrorist preparations, which may be a basement in a Western city. Compellence also has its limitations in this situation as the opponent, knowing the larger power’s inability to execute a war, could ignore the retaliatory strikes altogether. Further, the opponent could retaliate years later, when, from the perspective of the status quo power, the military operations have ended. There is the additional problem of the virtual impossibility of a negotiated settlement with terrorists who may be holding millenarian ideological objectives. Their strategy is war by indirect means, which implies avoiding direct contacts by all means.

Thus the rise of transnational terrorism has affected states in multiple ways. This does not mean that the nation-state will simply collapse in the face of the terrorist menace. States are slowly adapting to this menace, as is evident in the American response. The homeland security programs and plans of the US have shown that the state could devise new solutions to the problem, although foolproof security against terrorism may remain a false hope.

Nor is the struggle against terrorism all that new or unique. For example, in other eras piracy remained a major problem for hundreds of years, and it still occurs in pockets of the world. Although, even at its peak, the struggle against piracy did not remove inter-state naval competition, the presence of powerful non-state actors is nonetheless not a new phenomenon in world politics.\(^\text{65}\) As Bull has pointed out, in 18th and 19th century Europe, states co-existed and shared the stage with chartered companies, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary political parties, and national liberation movements.\(^\text{66}\) Moreover, even in the contemporary era, terrorism has been a perennial problem for states such as Russia, UK, India and many European and Middle Eastern states, especially Israel. The change is the growing transnational reach of terrorists and their increasing ability to inflict damage and panic on such
a power as the United States; indeed al Qaeda was able to reach the US heartland and attack citadels of American power, i.e., the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre. Furthermore, the nature of terrorism has changed. The terrorist groups in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were mostly state-sponsored and operated with limited aims and small-scale targets. The new transnational terrorists are typically not sponsored directly by states and they tend to operate from within and without of failed and failing states and from even supposedly strong states in Western Europe. The paradox is that while state sponsorship has decreased, the transnational presence of terrorist networks seems to have increased.

Nonetheless, what the war against terrorism has done is paradoxically bolstered the American state both internally and internationally. Internally, the state has consolidated its policing, border surveillance, and intelligence gathering capabilities in the Department of Homeland Security and increased its powers of surveillance within the Patriot Act. Internationally, the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 has been heavily military-oriented, with wars and policing actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, based on the Administration’s doctrine of ‘preemption’.67 In this regard, the profile of the American state is stronger and more central to the provision of national security after the September 11 attacks than ever before. Other states, both in the West and elsewhere, have responded to the threat of global terrorism in similar manners, by ratcheting up the authority of the national security state, rather than replacing it. While, as Philip Cerny suggests, this attempt to reassert state control may engender backlash, it has not, as yet, undermined state primacy in the provision of security.68

It would appear, then, that in none of the four core areas that we investigated has globalisation clearly and unambiguously altered the state’s central role in international security. Indeed, the evidence in support of the globalisation school’s prognostications is weak. States continue to arm, military spending is on the rise, multilateral security organisations, INGOs and PMCs still wield significantly less influence in the security theatre than the nation-state, and the challenge of global terrorism seems only to have reinforced the role of the state in the security realm. The most pronounced global change—the decline in interstate wars—cannot clearly be attributed to globalisation rather than unipolarity or the end of the Cold War. The only changes that we may

---


Millennium

be able to attribute to globalisation are the increasing reliance of states on the international arms market—rather than pursuing autarky—to supply the national security apparatus, and the increasing organisation and efforts of INGOs in the security realm—even if their effectiveness has been limited. These are rather modest changes that hardly herald a sea change in the way security is pursued.

Conclusions

In this article, we investigated the core arguments of globalisation theorists with respect to security. Specifically, by examining a wide spectrum of globalisation approaches, we distinguished four broad areas where changes ought to have plausibly emerged. Our investigation of the empirical record in these four areas reveals little unambiguous support for the globalisation arguments.

The absence of major interstate wars since the end of the Cold War provides some support for the globalisation school’s claims. Even here, however, we have no conclusive evidence to prove that states are abstaining from wars due to globalisation. First, there have often been periods of long peace in the international arena which were followed by periods of rivalry and conflicts. Second, the rise of American hegemony and the near-unipolarity in the international system constitutes an important pacifying condition, as minor powers do not often consider undertaking military actions for fear of economic and military reprisals. Thus, the reduction in interstate wars is overdetermined and cannot easily be attributed to globalisation.

Although military spending and war preparedness initially dipped in the direction that globalisation theorists expected in the early post-Cold War era, both climbed back up again toward the end of the 20th century and spiked after September 11, 2001. As evidenced by the increased arms spending by the major powers, as well as the steady growth of the global arms trade since 1998, it is reasonable to conclude that rather than going away, global security competition has begun to increase, and it is likely to accelerate during the present decade. Dramatic increases in US spending on defence and rapid innovations in military technology, especially in missile defence, are likely to force other major powers, including allies of Washington, to catch up as much as they can.

The role of international institutions also seems to have gone through periods of ups and downs in recent years. Overall, however, these institutions seem to serve secondary roles once the key states have already made the decisions. Moreover, the European Union, ASEAN, Mercosur and other regional organisations and institutions have acquired only limited security functions and cannot credibly compete with the nation-state as a security provider. The role of NGOs and other
transnational actors does seem to have increased in some dimensions of security policy. Yet, this seems episodic and confined to specific issues such as landmines and small arms. Moreover, they, too, are dependent on the most powerful nation-states and have not significantly affected the pursuit of security. As Harvey Starr contends, states and transnational forces can and will co-exist; the limited growth in NGO activity does not present a fundamental challenge to the nation-state.\(^6\) And, though states are increasingly using PMCs to assist their national security efforts, they typically do so only to a limited extent and retain control of the national security effort.

There are undoubtedly new types of security threats, most notably the threat of global terrorism. Here too, though, the state remains at the forefront and has actually been strengthened. In this respect, the state’s capacity to adapt to a new environment is a remarkable testimony to its resilience as a security providing institution.

To sum up, global social and economic forces are increasingly evident, but their manifestation in the realm of international security have thus far been limited. It is too soon to write off the national security state or the foundational principle of its existence: protection of its citizens. It also seems highly speculative to write off competition over arms, spheres of influence and power, and the potential for violence in the international system. At the same time, it would be dogmatic to argue that states presently cling to the military-security function in exactly the same way they did for centuries and thus will continue to do so in the future. Every social and political organisation has to adapt to changing circumstances if it wants to survive and the state is no exception to this rule. The recent trend of the ‘securitization’ of non-traditional areas of national security thus amounts to a largely successful attempt by the state to adapt to the new globalised environment, rather than the demise of the state that globalisation theorists predicted.\(^7\)

Indeed, the prediction that globalisation will undermine the state’s role as a national security provider evokes the ghosts of past predictions of the demise of the state’s security function. Prior to World War I, Norman Angell predicted that commerce would replace conquest in the industrial era, a prediction that has not yet come true.\(^8\) Following the development of nuclear weapons, John Herz concluded that the state

---


70. On securitization, see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1998). In this regard, we would conclude that, rather than being overtaken by globalisation, the state’s national security role has been altered.

Millennium

was no longer impermeable to outside threats and, hence, was obsolete as a security providing unit. As he put it, 'the nuclear age seemed to presage the end of territoriality and of the unit whose security had been based upon it'. However, this prediction, too, proved to be incorrect, as states adopted nuclear deterrent postures and the national security function of the state increased under the weight of the Cold War nuclear competition.

In the 1970s and 1980s, some interdependence scholars had already argued that economic interdependence had made the security function of the state less prominent. They believed that increased economic interdependence had a positive impact on the likelihood of peace, with economic interests overcoming the desire for military conquest. States, especially those connected by multiple social, political and economic relations, were taken to be less focussed on military security and military force in their relations with one another. Richard Rosecrance even suggested that ‘trading states’—states that specialised in particular industrial activities and relied on access to the international marketplace—would be the wave of the future. In his view, ‘Trading states recognize that they can do better economically through internal economic development sustained by a world-wide market for their goods and services than by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land’. However, under the powerful impact of the systemic competition ushered in by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent Carter-Reagan arms buildup, the interdependence school lost its prominence.


Where did these previous predictions go wrong? First, they neglected to take into the account the adaptability of the state as a social institution. The state has been able to adapt to changes in its economic and military environment and maintain its supremacy as a security providing institution. Second, predictions based on economic changes, such as Angell’s and the interdependence school’s, neglect the security underpinnings of economic exchange. If economic cooperation and interdependence flourished in the West during the Cold War, for example, this can be attributed to the bipolar alliance structure, American leadership and the security cooperation it engendered. If world trade has expanded in the post-Cold War era, that can be attributed to American global hegemony. It seems then, that changing security structures are more likely to transform economic patterns, than economic relations are to completely transform the pursuit of security. Finally, these predictions all make hasty long-term assumptions based on the experience of short historical periods. During the past three centuries, pauses in inter-state competition have occurred during different historical epochs, but such interregnums proved to be only temporary.

The predictions of the globalisation school are somewhat different from those of other theorists heralding the demise of the national security state. It is true, for example, that the breadth and depth of global social forces are more profound than previous engines of predicted change. In the past, predictions were made on the basis of a narrow set of variables, such as lethality of weapons, philosophical aversion to war, and economic cost/benefit calculations. In the contemporary phase, the changes are perceived to have multiple sources and they seem less transient in nature. Nonetheless, the globalisation school may suffer from the same three shortcomings. Those who expect the state to wither in the face of global pressures neglect the ability of the state to adapt, which is confirmed by our study.

Moreover, the geopolitical underpinnings of globalisation as an economic, political and cultural force lie in American hegemony and the limits on great power security cooperation it provides. By suggesting that globalisation is a force independent of this relatively stable security environment, globalisation theorists may be overstating its likely

Millennium

impact. Finally, although globalisation has been in the making for decades, it is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of its breadth and depth on the world stage. As a result, it is far too early to make predictions about its endurance—it could be challenged by political nationalism, economic collapse or ecological disaster—or its effects, especially since current trends do not bear out their predictions.

T.V. Paul is James McGill Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Norrin M. Ripsman is Associate Professor of Political Science at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada