Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis

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A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this essay, we examine the globalization school’s main propositions by analyzing the national security strategies of four categories of states: (1) major powers, (2) states in stable regions, (3) states in regions of enduring rivalries, and (4) weak and failed states. We conclude that the globalization school’s claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least. Although the weak and failed states also show signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the “symptoms” they manifest have more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges.

Globalization theorists (for example, Spyby 1996; Freedman 1998; Van Creveld 1999; Lipschutz 2000; Shaw 2000) suggest that the national security state has weakened under the impact of powerful global social forces. These forces have manifested themselves in several forms including the absence of major interstate wars, a decline in military expenditures, the rise of transnational actors, and the proliferation of nontraditional security challenges in the areas of transnational terrorism, the environment, and drug trafficking. Moreover, globalization theorists (Mandel 1994; Mathews 1997; Klare 2001) argue that because these new challenges are global in nature and require collective action, traditional state-centered approaches to security planning are ill suited to deal with such pressures. They contend, therefore, that states have responded to the new threats by altering the architecture of their national security establishments and by pursuing cooperative security, both nationally and internationally.
This globalization thesis, however, remains in the realm of conjecture because no systematic exploration of its predictions for the national security state has been undertaken. The purpose of this essay is to compare the main elements of the proposed paradigm with the behavior of the world’s national security apparatuses since the end of the Cold War. In particular, we explore whether states have reduced military expenditures, scaled back their armed forces, fought fewer interstate wars, restructured their national security establishments to confront the new challenges, and sought greater participation in defense activities from nongovernmental actors. Furthermore, we consider whether the effects of globalization, if they manifest themselves in the national security realm at all, do so evenly or unevenly. Most globalization arguments (Ohmae 1994; Held 1999; Mittelman 2000; Shaw 2000) are presented as if transnational political and economic forces are transforming national security states uniformly throughout the world. In contrast, we consider whether the power position of a state in the international system determines the degree to which these changes affect it. After all, realist writings on security (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1985; Mearsheimer 2001) emphasize that the great powers shape global forces more than they are shaped by them. Thus, we explore whether different categories of states (that is, major powers, middle powers, and weak states) are being impacted differentially by these changes. In addition, we check for regional variations, because it is reasonable to expect that states in less conflict prone regions might be more subject to the effects of globalization than those in regions plagued by enduring rivalries.

Our approach is as follows. For propositions concerning the effects of globalization that can be easily examined using independent sources of information such as those relating to manpower and defense expenditures, we rely on both national and regional data provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) or the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (IPRI). For propositions that are more difficult to assess directly with more quantitative information such as the degree to which national security establishments have shifted their emphasis to new security threats, we study the national security doctrines and policy statements of each state to see whether they reflect such “globalized” concerns. Although official doctrines and policy statements may, at times, merely reflect declaratory rather than actual policy, they do represent a good first cut at the logic that animates a state’s national security strategy, the threats that matter most to its security establishment, and the degree to which it has evolved to meet the demands of a globalized world. Moreover, these documents can often be revealing not only by what they say but also by what they do not say. Thus, as we shall see, the omission of any serious reference to the importance of multilateral regional security organizations in Russian, South Asian, and Middle Eastern doctrines—despite the obvious rhetorical imperative of paying lip service to them—casts significant doubt on the centrality of such institutions in the contemporary era, at least for these states. Nonetheless, we explore military doctrines critically and, when possible, seek additional information from secondary sources to corroborate our conclusions.

We will show that the globalization school’s claims are overstated as states of all types appear to pursue more traditional security policies than those globalization theorists would expect. In addition, in many instances national security states have conform ed to the school’s expectations, but strategic circumstances rather than globalization seem to be the cause. Moreover, to the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions have transformed their national security establishments the most to meet the challenges of globalization, whereas those in conflict ridden regions have done so the least. The great powers have adapted to globalization only when it was consistent with their own strategic imperatives. Finally, very weak or failed states such as those in sub-Saharan Africa have had their fragile national security estab-
lishments buffeted by the pressures of globalization, adding further impetus for state collapse.

**Key Propositions**

The emerging globalization literature (Ohmae 1994; Spyby 1996; Freedman 1998; Held 1999; Van Creveld 1999; Lipschutz 2000; Mittelman 2000; Shaw 2000) includes the assumption that several features of the contemporary international system—principally, the nature of technology and the ease with which people, goods, services, and ideas cross national borders—have transformed the ways in which states pursue national security. To begin with, the literature contends that in the contemporary era the nature of threats has changed. States traditionally organized to defend themselves against rival states, which were the only actors that could amass sufficient capabilities to threaten their interests. Two processes have altered this dynamic. First, the overwhelming destructive capability of modern military technology has decreased the likelihood of traditional interstate wars because even the loser of a modern war between states with roughly equal capability will suffer extensively (Held 1999:101). Thus, wars tend not to be all-encompassing “Clausewitzian interstate wars” but rather low-intensity conflicts involving smaller states with lower levels of technology, and they are frequently civil or ethnic wars, insurgencies, or counterinsurgencies (Thompson 1989:1–23; Holsti 1996:36–41). Second, in a globalized and wired world, states cannot easily prevent hostile groups from recruiting and organizing across the globe, hacking computers and interfering with global commerce, or transporting hazardous materials, money, or weapons across national borders (Van Creveld 1999:394–408; for a different set of economic threats to the nation-state, see Ohmae 1994; Lipschutz 2000). As a result, smaller, substate actors have the ability to challenge nation states by disrupting their economies, spreading disease, or engaging in terrorist activities (Freedman 1998: 48–63).

The literature thus suggests the following propositions about the nature of security threats in a globalized world:

*Proposition 1:* A shift in the nature of wars from Clausewitzian interstate wars to “wars of a third kind”—civil ethnic wars and wars between small states—has taken place.

*Proposition 2:* States, particularly the United States, face the challenge of “post-industrial warfare.” This concept refers to a new kind of threat: global assault by unprofessional, ideological combatants, operating in deprived areas, targeting civilians, and businesses (Klare 2001:433–437).

*Proposition 3:* National security increasingly includes the non-defense areas of trade, ecology, and health as threats are increasingly economic, environmental, and disease-related.

In large part because of the redefinition of national security threats, the globalization thesis asserts that states are changing the way they organize their national security apparatuses. Taking advantage of the decrease in the likelihood of tradi-

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2Although we use the shorthand “the globalization school” for the group of arguments that we examine, in reality this reference represents a composite of a variety of arguments that are related only because they explore the effects of the phenomenon of globalization on the pursuit of national security. We feel it is useful to cull out and explore a set of propositions flowing from this school in much the same way that international relations scholars (for example, Keohane 1986; Baldwin 1993; Moravcsik 1997:513–553) have done with disparate neorealist arguments (united by their emphasis on the impact of international anarchy on international politics) and liberal arguments (united by their emphasis on the impact of individuals and institutions on international politics). However, we acknowledge the diversity in the literature in this area and the contending views it has generated among enthusiasts and opponents (for differing views, see Paul, Ikenberry, and Hall 2003; Aydinli and Rosenau 2004; and Paul and Ripsman 2004).
tional interstate war and utilizing the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, they are abandoning offensive strategic doctrines in favor of defense or deterrence (Giddens 1990:74–75; Van Creveld 1999:352–353). Moreover, technological advances in warfare encourage states to rely on more efficient high-tech weaponry, instead of traditional, manpower-based military apparatuses. As a result, national conscription and overall defense spending are declining because paying, mobilizing, and supporting servicemen are the most cost-intensive components of the defense budget. Military establishments are, therefore, supposed to be becoming smaller, more mobile, and more potent (Van Creveld 1999:412–414). Furthermore, as it increasingly faces lower-intensity challenges and threats by individuals and groups rather than traditional battles, the national security state is shifting from a war-fighting apparatus to a crime-fighting and policing apparatus, not only externally, but also internally (Mathews 1997:50–51; Lipschutz 2000:43; Andreas and Price 2001:31–52). Consider the following propositions:

**Proposition 4:** National conscription and the size of the military apparatus are declining.

**Proposition 5:** Defense spending is declining.

**Proposition 6:** National military doctrines are abandoning offense in favor of defense or deterrence.

**Proposition 7:** Military establishments are shifting from being war fighters to police forces.

Finally, globalization theorists (Mandel 1994:1–8) conclude that the emergence of new threats and the contraction of national military apparatuses have eroded the exclusivity of the state as a provider of national security because the state is incapable of meeting its security needs on its own. Instead, national security establishments are increasingly looking both inside and outside the state to form partnerships that can provide security more economically and more effectively (Cha 2000:391–403). Inside the state, national armed forces are enlisting the services of private companies that can assist them in gathering, processing, and monitoring information (Coker 1999:95–113; Van Creveld 1999:404–407; Mandel 2000). Outside the state, they are increasingly pursuing security within multilateral frameworks, particularly regional security organizations such as NATO, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the OAS (Holsti 1996:129; Held et al. 1999:124–135). In addition, given that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations depend on winning the hearts and minds of the local population, states are relying on the friendlier faces of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as a means of delivering humanitarian aid and thereby fostering stability (Cha 2000; Mandel 2000).

This discussion suggests the following propositions:

**Proposition 8:** States are privatizing security by including nonstate actors in defense activities.

**Proposition 9:** States are increasingly pursuing security through regional institutions.

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3 Smaller armies have an additional advantage in the modern world given that democracies no longer have the stomach for war, at least if they anticipate casualties. Edward Luttwak (1995:109–122) attributes this effect to shrinking family size and, therefore, the decreased willingness of families to part with loved ones in war. (See also Mann 1999:237–261.)

4 Among globalization theorists, Anthony Giddens (1990:74–75) is the exception, arguing that a shift to a higher-tech military should actually increase defense spending, as even poorer states must purchase high-tech weaponry to survive.
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the validity of these propositions by examining the military doctrines and defense policies of four categories of states as well as by studying empirical data on national military establishments since the late 1980s.

**Power, Position, and Globalization**

Realists (Carr 1946; Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1985) contend that international phenomena affect states differently depending on their relative power and position within the international system. Typically, major powers, by virtue of their superior power resources—which help them maintain their independence vis-à-vis international pressures as well as aid in shaping them—are least affected by international political, economic, and military changes. Yet, they simultaneously are best able to take advantage of changes in economic organization and military technologies to enhance their power. Thus, realists might expect the major powers to be in command of globalization, making concessions to it only when globalization increases their power advantage over others, rather than at its mercy. In addition, a state’s position in the international system also affects its foreign and defense policy responses to systemic pressures. It is possible, therefore, that responses to globalization may also vary depending on a state’s position. All things being equal, we might expect that states located in stable regions will be the most affected by the pressures of globalization. States engaged in enduring rivalries (in regions of conflict) might be more resistant to its pressures because they are most eager to preserve their autonomy to defend their national and regional interests. Finally, very weak or failed states might be completely unable to buffer themselves from the pressures of globalization and, therefore, might be completely at their mercy. In what follows, we will investigate whether globalization has, indeed, affected the pursuit of national security in these four types of states, which we will define more concretely before proceeding.

**Major Powers and Global Social Forces**

Major powers are the most influential states in the international system and are, therefore, its key military-security actors. They maintain global power projection capabilities that allow them to claim international leadership positions. These states acquire military capabilities not simply to defend their homelands but also to maintain coercive power over secondary states and balance against rival states and those that are potential rivals. Among major powers, security behavior varies depending on whether the states are hegemonic, status quo, declining, or rising powers (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981). In the post-Cold War system, the United States has emerged as the status quo hegemonic power, Russia as the declining great power, and China as the rising great power in terms of their overall power attributes and dispositions (Paul, Wirtz, and Fortman 2004). These structural situations should affect their approaches toward security and military power. Thus, we consider how globalization has affected the national security establishments of each of these three major powers. We do not consider Great Britain and France as major powers, including them instead in the next category. We do so because their major power attributes have declined rather dramatically over the years and because they have been active members of the European Union.

**States in Cooperative Regional Subsystems**

Among the next level of powers, some find themselves in regional subsystems with relatively stable security environments. Two types of stable subsystems are possible.
In the first, regional cooperation is highly developed and institutionalized. Members of the European Union (EU), who have already established a pluralistic security community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998), are the best example of this category of states. The second is a subsystem in which states have achieved some cooperative institutional arrangements but lack protracted militarized rivalries and have not yet formed a true security community. These include Southeast Asia and the southern cone of Latin America, where states are in the process of building security communities around ASEAN and Mercosur. Because these latter states do not face powerful existential challenges and have less of a need than the major powers to project their authority beyond their region, we expect them to respond most positively to the pressures of globalization. After all, they have the fewest incentives to bear the burden of resisting global pressures in order to retain control of their national security establishments. To explore the globalization propositions in this category of state, we shall examine one of each type of stable region by focusing on Western Europe and Latin America and by considering how the region as a whole has responded to contemporary changes as well as how leading states in these regions have responded.

States in Competitive Regional Subsystems

Other regional powers inhabit competitive regional subsystems characterized by protracted conflicts and enduring militarized rivalries. These conflicts are driven by intractable issues such as territory, ideology, and identity. Moreover, the conflict relationships among states in these regions spill into most spheres of their interstate interactions (Diehl 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2001). These states enjoy no credible security protection from outside and are frequently targets of economic and military sanctions by the major powers who are often heavily involved in regional affairs. Some of the larger states in these regions seek regional hegemony, whereas others face major power interventions in their internal affairs. Because of the chaotic security environments these states face, their military planning and preparations are based on worst-case assumptions.

Two regions rife with such rivalries are South Asia and the Middle East. In the former, regional security is dominated by the territorial conflict between nuclear rivals India and Pakistan. In the latter, regional dynamics are conditioned by the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab competition for leadership of the Arab world, and US clashes with the Gulf States (particularly Iran and Iraq) as Washington attempts to secure its oil interests in the region. We can assume that if any states want to resist the forces of globalization and retain national control of their military apparatuses as sovereignty-protecting instruments, it should be these states given that the costs of relinquishing national control are probably the highest. To assess how globalization has affected this category of state, we shall consider how South Asia and the Middle East as well as the leading regional actors in these two areas have responded to contemporary changes.

Weak and Failed States

The final type of state we consider includes weak and failed states. Mostly in Africa, these states have been unable to create state structures sufficient to provide security or economic protection for their citizens. Weak states are characterized by a low level of economic and political development and weak domestic political institutions. Many are beset with problems of internal conflict driven by ethnic rivalries and political and economic inefficiencies. Their state institutions often lack legitimacy; their state laws receive little compliance from citizens (Migdal 1998:xiii). The capacity of these states to protect citizens from predators is also minimal. Weak states lack both what Michael Mann (1993:59) calls “despotic power” — the power of
the state elite over civil society—and "infrastructural power"—the institutional capacity of the state to penetrate the territory and implement decisions effectively. The African continent offers the best examples of weak and failing states, although some exist in the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Latin America as well. There are, however, variations within this category. Some states—such as Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola—have a "volatile mix of armed conflict, unstable political institutions, limited resources and inevitably, a "bad neighborhood" of similar crisis ridden states (Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001:8). Others—such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Benin—have been able to avoid violent conflicts and are "negotiating risky transitions toward democracy" (Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001:2; see also Gurr and Marshall 2003).

We expect that globalization will have the most destabilizing effect on this type of state because the countries are already losing their grip on national sovereignty and defense. To study the globalization propositions with regard to this group, we will assess sub-Saharan Africa as a whole rather than focusing on individual states. We do so because their very failure makes it difficult to get reliable information on them individually.

**Major Powers**

Given the propositions we have outlined above and the categories of states we have just described, let us examine how accurate the globalization theorists are at explaining contemporary national security policies beginning with the major powers.

With respect to the propositions concerned with the changing nature of wars and post-industrial warfare in the contemporary era (Propositions 1 and 2), two of the major powers do, indeed, seem to be fighting different kinds of war. Rather than waging Clausewitzian style interstate wars, they are increasingly fighting counter-insurgencies, counterterrorist operations, and other low-intensity conflicts. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, Russia has fought a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against well-organized bands of rebels in Chechnya, but it has avoided active participation in any other interstate conflict. China also has avoided interstate wars.

The United States, however, is a more complex case. Although it, too, has participated in low-intensity conflicts such as the civil war in Somalia and has fought in limited-scale operations such as the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, it has also fought in more traditional—if atypical—interstate wars. In particular, the United States played the primary role in two wars against Iraq and the 2001 war against Afghanistan. These wars, which pitted US and coalition forces against the national armed forces of the opposing state, cannot properly be called low-intensity conflicts or "wars of a third kind." This discrepancy between the United States and the other two major powers may stem from the fact that, as global hegemon, it bears primary responsibility for global security and has global interests that can draw it into conflict with others, whereas China and Russia do not.

It is clear from Chinese and Russian military doctrines, though, that their military planners still contemplate national defense primarily in terms of traditional interstate warfare. The first of five national security goals articulated in the 2002 Chinese White Paper on Defense (section II) was "[t]o consolidate national defense, [and to] prevent and resist aggression." The document clarifies this goal by stating that China "implements the military strategy of active defense, strengthens the building of its armed forces and that of its frontier defense, sea defense, and air defense, takes effective defensive and administrative measures to defend national security and safeguards its maritime rights and interests" (China 2002:section II). To achieve these traditional goals, China is modernizing its strategic forces to facilitate "the defense of Chinese sovereignty and national territory against threats or attacks"
from all manner of opponents” (Swaine and Tellis 2000:121). Moreover, it may use traditional military means, if necessary, to achieve its second goal, “complete reunification of the motherland,” which could potentially mean a war to regain Taiwan. Indeed, the doctrine states that China will pursue a peaceful reunification, but that “it will not forswear the use of force” (China 2002:section II). Similarly, the most recent Russian national security doctrine (Russia’s Military Doctrine 2002:section I, paragraph 7), although acknowledging that the risk of an attack on Russia has declined, still relies on both conventional and nuclear weapons “to deter (prevent) aggression against it and (or) its allies.” Thus, none of the major powers have truly moved beyond preparing for traditional warfare, at least not in their official postures.

All three major powers have had extensive experience with post-industrial warfare. The United States has been targeted by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network both at home and abroad (in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya, and elsewhere). As a result, it has become embroiled not only in outright wars, but also in classic post-industrial warfare campaigns including limited strikes at terrorist targets, intelligence gathering and monitoring, attempts to disrupt the financing of terrorism, and efforts to provide economic and political assistance to states in which terrorists might make inroads. Meanwhile, Russia has been involved in a bloody counterterrorism campaign resulting from the Chechen war, in which Chechen rebels have targeted not only the Russian military but also civilian targets such as Moscow apartment buildings and music halls. For its part, China has its own secessionists in Xinjiang province, the Uighur separatists, who are believed to be affiliated with an East Turkestan terrorist network. Moreover, it has used the US-led war on terrorism to ratchet up its suppression of Falun Gong (see Lam 2001). Thus, in the contemporary era, terrorism and post-industrial warfare have begun to occupy a great deal of major power attention, even though in their doctrines interstate warfare remains a central concern.

With regard to the changing nature of threats (Proposition 3), there is no evidence that the major powers have recast their national security policies radically to address the new economic, ecological, and medical threats that globalization theorists believe constitute a significant component of the “new security” (Ayoob 1997:121–146; Klare and Thomas 1994). To be sure, some of today’s major powers devote attention to these new concerns. The US National Security Strategy (Bush 2002), for example, identifies a variety of goals and threats in addition to traditional military security. It assumes that “[a] strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.” Therefore, the promotion of economic development and free trade is a component of US strategic doctrine. Furthermore, it advocates protecting the environment and energy security. Finally, it commits itself to fighting pandemics—such as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis—which can interfere with economic growth and development and, consequently, with US security goals (Bush 2002:17–20, 23). Thus, US strategic planning addresses a wide variety of new security threats, as globalization theorists would expect. Nonetheless, from the structure of the document, these threats take a back seat both to traditional security threats and also to the current overriding priority of combating terrorism.

Russian military doctrine also identifies some new security threats in the contemporary security environment. Specifically, it identifies “prevention of ecological and other emergencies and elimination of their consequences” as one of the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ missions (Russia’s Military Doctrine 2002:section I, paragraph 16b). Nonetheless, in the key sections outlining the main external and internal threats Russia faces, only traditional military issues, sovereignty protection, and counterterrorist concerns are enumerated (Russia’s Military Doctrine 2002:section I, paragraphs 5–6). Thus, nonmilitary security would appear to remain a low priority for Russia.
Official Chinese doctrine makes no reference to nontraditional security threats. Indeed, the 2002 Chinese White Paper cast Chinese goals in terms of resisting aggression, reuniting the motherland, stopping armed subversion, engaging in defense modernization, and safeguarding world peace (China 2002:section II). Environmental, economic, and medical threats were not mentioned at all. The major powers, therefore, address new threats to different degrees, although none of them make these concerns national defense priorities.

At least on the surface, US and Russian defense spending figures fit the globalization theorists’ expectations (Proposition 4) during the 1990s. The US defense budget decreased considerably in the first decade after the Cold War, dropping steadily from over $354 billion in 1992 to $274 billion in 1998. It remained at that level with limited fluctuation until 2002, when it jumped back to $379 billion. Russian defense spending declined sharply from an estimated $80 billion in 1992 to a low of under $31 billion in 1998 before climbing back to almost $44 billion in 2001. Given that both countries increased their defense budgets early in the twenty-first century, however, it would be difficult to attribute the initial decrease in Russian and US defense spending to the pressures of globalization rather than to the relatively stable world of unipolarity after the Soviet Union’s demise (see Wohlforth 1999:5–41) as well as to the dire economic circumstances that Russia faced after the Cold War. Indeed, the substantial increase in US defense allocations after the September 11 attacks suggests that the changing threat environment rather than international economic forces was shaping US defense spending.

This picture is confirmed when we consider Chinese figures. In 1992, China spent an estimated $15.4 billion on defense. After declining to an estimated $13.6 billion in 1994, it has surged to $19 billion in 1998 and $27 billion in 2001. These recent increases probably reflect both the rapid advance of the Chinese economy and its desire to modernize its South China fleet. The Chinese experience, however, underscores that major power military spending since the Cold War appears to continue to reflect relative power and interests rather than the pressures of globalization.

There is more support for the globalization school when it comes to issues of manpower (Proposition 5). In the last two decades, the size of the US armed forces has declined sharply. In 1985–1986, before the Cold War ended, the United States had over 2.1 million men in active service. That figure dropped steadily throughout the 1990s to a low of under 1.4 million in 2000–2001. Even after the September 11 terrorist attacks, active US manpower rose only marginally in 2002–2003 to over 1.4 million. During this same time period, Russian manpower dropped even more dramatically from 5.3 million in active service in 1985–1986 to just under 4 million in 1990–1991 and under 1 million in 2002–2003. And Chinese manpower has steadily declined from 3.9 million in 1985–1986 to under 2.3 million in 2002–2003. This dramatic reduction in great power military manpower is consistent with the globalization school’s predictions.

Regarding defensive and deterrent doctrines (Proposition 6) in the early post-Cold War era, it appears that the military doctrines of the major powers were, indeed, becoming defensive and deterrent in nature. The end of the Cold War left the former Soviet Union without the means to carry out an offensive strategy and the United States without a significant challenger. Thus, in the early 1990s, Washington’s military doctrine was largely defensive and deterrent—targeting potential

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6These official figures may underestimate Chinese defense expenditures, which are believed to be at least three times higher (see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm).

7Information on national manpower comes from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1989–2003).
long-range challengers and instability in critical regions such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—although the political component of US grand strategy sought to expand the US sphere of influence by spreading democracy and market economies (see Lake 1993). Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, however, US strategic doctrine has regained an offensive posture. Strikingly, the grand strategy of “pre-emption” that President Bush unveiled in September 2002 emphasizes “destroying the threat before it reaches our borders” and “convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.” It boldly claims that “the best defense is a good offense,” thus the United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture to weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002:6). Clearly, the United States is no longer counting on its overwhelming military and technological superiority to dissuade adversaries from attacking it.

Conversely, Russian strategy is far more defensive and deterrent in nature. The most recently articulated Russian Military Doctrine (2002:section I, paragraph 8), for example, begins by stating that their “military Doctrine is defensive in nature . . . with a firm resolve to defend national interests and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.” The priority given to defense is conditioned by the strategic environment, which is characterized by “a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war.” In this more stable environment, Russia maintains its nuclear forces solely as a means of deterring both nuclear and conventional attacks on itself and its allies from nuclear-armed states. Thus, offense gets almost no play within Russian military doctrine.

The official Chinese military doctrine is also defensive in orientation, although it is difficult to reconcile certain Chinese foreign policy goals with a defensive doctrine. China’s declaratory foreign security policy is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in other state’s internal affairs, mutual nonaggression, and the resolution of all international issues by peaceful means (see China 2002:section II). Significantly, the principle of no first use of Chinese nuclear weapons reinforces this defensive-deterrent posture. Nonetheless, some of China’s stated foreign security policy goals are more outward looking and potentially offensive. In particular, Chinese policy states clearly that “the goals and tasks of China’s national defense” include “to stop separation and realize complete reunification of the motherland.” It also acknowledges explicitly not only that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China,” but that, in the quest for reunification, China “will not forswear the use of force” (China 2002:section II). Thus, Chinese military doctrine leaves open the possibility of offensive operations against Taiwan and, by implication, the United States. Other issues—such as separatism, border disputes with India, and close relations with North Korea and Pakistan—raise questions about the so-called defensive nature of the Chinese doctrine. We can best represent Chinese military doctrine, therefore, as somewhat of a hybrid or “calculative” approach (Swaine and Tellis 2000:Ch. 4) that is based on the particular target. In sum, there is no clear trend among the great powers away from offensive military doctrines.

What about the shift from war-fighting to policing (Proposition 7)? Although the major powers have retained their focus on war-fighting, they have simultaneously added a policing dimension to their military missions in order to fight terrorism, to interdict drug smugglers and organized crime, and to provide domestic order. In its war against terrorism, the United States has constructed a new security institution, the Department of Homeland Security, to prevent future attacks on US soil. This department, which controls border crossings, intelligence gathering and analysis, and other policing and monitoring apparatuses, is a centerpiece of President Bush’s post-September 11 national security approach (see Bush 2002:6, 29–31). But even before 2001, the United States was using its military apparatus to combat narcotics trafficking and to assist Latin American states in their efforts to defeat
drug cartels and smugglers. Such actions remain part of US national security doctrine (Bush 2002:10).

The Russian military doctrine lists among its national security goals combating “organized crime, terrorism, smuggling and other illegal activities on a scale threatening to the Russian Federation’s military security.” In addition, it targets “illegal activities by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and destabilizing the domestic political situation in the country” (Russia’s Military Doctrine 2002:section I, paragraph 6). As a result, part of the mission of the military is crime-fighting and maintaining domestic order.

China, too, uses its national security apparatus “to stop armed subversion and safeguard social stability.” Chinese national defense policy states explicitly that “regarding maintenance of public order and social stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any kind, crush infiltration and sabotaging activities by hostile forces, and crack down on all criminal activities that threaten public order, so as to promote social stability and harmony” (China 2002:section II). One need only consider the military’s response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests or its crackdown on Falun Gong to see that internal policing is part of its bailiwick. All three great powers’ doctrines indicate that in addition to their more traditional security functions, the military establishments are increasingly performing internal and international policing roles.

There is little evidence that the major powers have attempted to privatize the provision of national defense responsibilities in any meaningful way (Proposition 8). None of the three major powers mention cooperation with private institutions or NGOs in their official doctrines as a means of achieving their security objectives. This observation should not be surprising in the case of Russia and China as “outsourcing” is a distinctly capitalist innovation and “civil society” is a decidedly Western concept. But the exclusion of these strategies from the new US strategic blueprint is interesting. It is true that since September 11, Washington has begun to encourage private–public partnerships to facilitate homeland defense against terrorist attacks (Eckert 2003). Furthermore, the Pentagon outsources to supply and service much of its equipment (see Clay-Mendez 1995). Of greater interest, perhaps, the United States has begun to contract private security companies in support of some of its overseas activities. Such companies have played a limited role in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq and a more important role in the fight against drug cartels in South America (for example, the $2 billion Andean Regional Initiative). But, it would appear that even Washington is reluctant to cut costs by delegating critical national security tasks to private organizations (for an alternative point of view, see Silverstein 2000:chapter 4).

With regard to regional institutions (Proposition 9), each of the major powers appears to value regional security arrangements that can stabilize their security environments, but they all are prepared to act independently if it serves their interests. The new US national security doctrine, for example, asserts that “there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.” Consequently, it advocates collaboration with NATO, the European Union, and US allies to safeguard US and Western interests (Bush 2002:25–28). In practice, though, the Bush Administration has preferred to work with ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” to further US goals even at the expense of allied relations, as its unilateral war against Iraq in 2003 indicates. The Chinese national defense policy also identifies a role for regional institutions. It (China 2002:section I) asserts that “the Chinese government pays great attention to and actively participates in international security cooperation, and advocates the development of international security cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, and other universally recognized norms of international relations.” In particular, it credits the ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the ASEAN Regional Forum with helping stabilize the Asia-Pacific region and, therefore, improving Chinese security (China 2002:section VI). The bulk of the White Paper, however, lays out a rather independent defense policy.

Of the three major powers, Russian military doctrine devotes the least attention to regional security frameworks. One of the last elements of its security policy states that “the Russian Federation attaches priority importance to the development of military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty states on the basis of the need to consolidate the efforts to create a single defense area and safeguard collective military security” (Russia’s Military Doctrine 2002:section III, paragraph 8). Nonetheless, the government prefaces this statement by emphasizing that military cooperation is a “state’s prerogative” that it exercises “on the basis of its own national interests” (Russia’s Military Doctrine 2002:section III, paragraph 6). Thus, in sum, the three major powers appear to view regional security institutions as potentially useful instruments to advance their own national interests, but they are clearly prepared to work around institutions and alliances if they believe their interests are better served by doing so.

In effect, the major powers do not provide strong evidence for the globalization propositions. Indeed, they find little support in Russian, Chinese, and US military doctrines. These states continue to prepare for traditional interstate wars, spend on defense when their interests demand it, and eschew meaningful participation in national defense by regional and private actors. Only in the areas of manpower and the inclusion of post-industrial warfare and policing operations into their doctrines and actions do they behave in line with what globalization theorists would expect.

States in Stable Regions

When we turn our attention to non-major powers in stable regions and consider the changing nature of wars and post-industrial warfare (Propositions 1 and 2), we observe that the states of Western Europe have not fought a traditional interstate war on their own soil for decades. Nonetheless, they did participate in the international coalition against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. The United Kingdom also played a significant role in the war against Afghanistan and in the 2003 war against Iraq. On a doctrinal level, the two principal national security states in Western Europe—the United Kingdom and France (both veto-holding members of the UN Security Council)—continue to prepare for traditional engagements, although with more advanced technology and, potentially, against enemies that possess weapons of mass destruction (see United Kingdom 2001b; République Française 2002). Thus, although the Europeans have also participated in numerous lower-level conflicts—such as the bombing campaign against Serbia—and peacekeeping operations, there is little evidence to conclude that they have shifted their focus away from traditional military engagements.

They have, however, begun to devote considerable attention to battling terrorism and the challenge of post-industrial warfare. French defense planners, for example, acknowledge that global terrorism threatens Western Europe almost as much as it does the United States (Durand 2002:2). Thus, they are beefing up their special forces to fight terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (République Française 2002:chapters 1 and 3). British defense planners similarly assert that “nationalism, religion and single-issue activism will continue to produce extremists prepared to use terrorism to achieve their aims. . . . Such groups may pose the most immediate, if small scale and localized, threat to UK interests.” They conclude that, although it has not been the focus of the British military
establishment in the past, “crime, terrorism and political extremism may increasingly require a military element to the Government response” (United Kingdom 2001b:paragraphs 68, 76).

In Latin America, which has largely avoided interstate wars—with a few notable exceptions such as the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador—since the end of the Cold War, national security doctrines lack a clearly defined purpose. Nonetheless, the Brazilian military establishment intends to retain the capability to wage traditional wars. For, after observing how the current international environment has stabilized, the Brazilian White Paper (Brazil 1996:section I, paragraph 2.11) on defense argues that “the country has not been entirely free of risks. Despite its status as a peaceful member of the international community, Brazil could be forced into externally generated conflicts which might threaten its patrimony and its vital interests.” Hence, it offers rather traditionally oriented strategy guidelines to the armed forces (Brazil 1996:section 4). In Argentina, the only Latin American country to participate in the 1991 Gulf War coalition, however, doctrine has shifted away from fighting traditional interstate wars toward interoperability with alliance partners for peacekeeping and other purposes. Indeed, that country’s White Paper (Argentina n.d.:part II, chapter V, section 3) vaguely states that “the main goal of our policy regarding the military is the modernization and reorganization of the Armed Forces, adapting them to the new world requirements, including the re-definition of military missions and the promotion of jointness.” It would be hard to classify such behavior as a major shift from interstate wars to low-intensity conflicts, though.

Further afield from the US war on terrorism, Latin American defense policies vary in their emphasis on counterterrorism. The Brazilian White Paper makes no mention of terrorism or post-industrial warfare. In contrast, Argentina—which has a history of high profile terrorist attacks, particularly against its Jewish community—identifies international terrorism and extremism as a key challenge for the armed forces (Argentina n.d.:part II, chapter V, section 3; see also Argentina n.d.:part I, chapter III, section 2). Thus, neither Western Europe nor Latin America provide clear evidence of a shift in focus from interstate wars to low-intensity conflicts. And, although fighting terrorism is finding its way onto most of their national security agendas, not all states in these stable regions have geared their armed forces up for post-industrial warfare.

Consider the contrast, however, regarding the need to respond to changing threats (Proposition 3). States in stable regions pay more attention to nontraditional security threats. In Western Europe, as Cold War threats disappear, most defense establishments have turned their attention to such new security threats. The United Kingdom, thus, devotes sections of its defense blueprint to the economic and environmental dimensions of national security. It highlights global warming, resource scarcity, overpopulation, income disparities, and infectious diseases as leading concerns for Western defense planners (United Kingdom 2001a, 2001c). French policy, even though more traditional in focus, still includes organized crime and trafficking in arms and drugs as potential security threats (République Française 2002:chapter 3).

In Latin America, where credible international threats are even more remote, the definition of national security has been broadened to address a wide range of nontraditional threats. Argentina’s White Paper on National Defense (n.d.:part II, chapter V, section 3), for example, includes among its “main defense interests,” “economic and social growth, [s]cientific and technological development, [p]rotection of the Nation from the drug trafficking [sic] and international terrorism, [r]enewable and non renewable [sic] resources, [and] [e]nvironmental protection.” Thus, a key mission of the Argentine military instrument is to assist “national and international efforts towards a better standard of living” and efforts at environmental protection (Argentina n.d.:part III, chapter IX, section 3). The Brazilian military is charged with interdicting the drug trade and operations in the Amazon
to promote economic development and environmental protection (Brazil 2002). Thus, in effect, states facing stable security environments have securitized a host of nontraditional issue areas in line with the globalization school’s hypotheses.

There is no discernable trend in defense spending or manpower (Propositions 4 and 5) among states in this category. Defense spending for all of Western Europe declined from over $211 billion in 1991 to just over $181 billion in 2001. During the same time period, the number of NATO Europeans in the armed forces dropped to just over 2.3 million in 2001 from over 3.1 million in 1985. Of course, some countries bucked the trend, including Greece, which increased its defense budget steadily from almost $4.7 billion in 1991 to over $6.5 billion in 2001, and Italy, which increased its budget from almost $22 billion to almost $25 billion in this same time period. Every country in the region, though reduced its military manpower. On the whole, the European decrease in defense allocations seems to reflect the reduced risk to the region in the wake of the end of the Soviet threat. Countries in Southeastern Europe may have ratcheted up their military preparedness in the uncertain climate caused by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East.

In contrast, South America, a region whose security climate was considerably less affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, experienced a moderate increase in regional defense spending, coupled with a small increase in military manpower. In 1991, the region spent $16.5 billion on defense; a decade later, that figure rose to $24.7 billion. In addition, the armed services in South America actually increased from 853,200 active servicemen in 1985 to 922,000 in 2001. Moreover, some leading regional players (including Brazil, Chile, and Colombia) increased their investment in defense substantially. Most strikingly, Brazil almost trebled its defense budget from over $5.6 billion in 1992 to over $14 billion in 2001. Thus, leading regional powers have behaved rather differently in the new security environment.

With regard to the focus on defensive and deterrent doctrines (Proposition 6), there is a clear trend away from offensive doctrines in stable regions. The military doctrines of the leading states of Western Europe all reflect the relatively stable strategic context of the post-Cold War era and, hence, are defensive and deterrent in orientation. The British doctrine is, thus, predicated on maintaining the NATO alliance as a deterrent to larger challengers, remaining engaged in likely trouble spots such as the Balkans, stabilizing potential flashpoints, and combating transnational crime, terrorism, and political extremism through careful intelligence, monitoring, and, if necessary, military means (United Kingdom 2001b, 2001d). French military doctrine also remains largely defensive and deterrent in orientation, although its goals have shifted. Its nuclear policy retains its deterrent character, but under President Jacques Chirac the emphasis of French conventional defense strategy has become to project power in tandem with its European allies in order to prevent conflicts abroad and to intervene in ongoing armed conflicts (Rynning 2002:chapter 5). Although these are somewhat outward-looking goals, with the aim of expanding French influence worldwide, they do not appear to be offensive in nature.

Without credible national security threats, the major states in South America have even less need for offensive doctrines in the contemporary era. Thus, Argentina’s primary defense goals are the preservation of the “sovereignty and independence of the Argentine Nation; its territorial integrity; its right to self-determination; the protection of the life and freedom of its people” (Argentina n.d.:part II, section 2). Given that these vital interests are not presently in jeopardy, Argentina’s International Security Policy largely consists of cooperation with allies and the international community, prevention of WMD proliferation, and the pursuit of arms control (Argentina n.d.:part III, section 5). The Brazilian military similarly faces no real challenges to its primary missions: “to defend the fatherland, guarantee the constitutionally established powers, and on the initiative of any of said powers, law and order” (Brazil 2002:paragraph 1). Therefore, it, too, has been searching for a new role by participating in international peacekeeping operations,
efforts to combat the regional drug trade, and through civic activities. Clearly, the leading powers in both of these stable regions have adopted non-offensive doctrines as globalization theorists predict.

With respect to a shift from war-fighting to policing (Proposition 7), states in stable regions without existential security threats have embraced policing duties for their national security establishments to an even greater extent than the major powers. Increasingly, they define national security in terms of combating terrorism, disrupting the drug trade, and participating in international peacekeeping operations to provide stability to troubled regions. As discussed above, the British White Paper on Defence identifies terrorism and organized crime as two key threats to British interests that will increasingly require a military response. As a consequence, British military planners expect to involve the armed forces more heavily in operations akin to policing in the future. French doctrine (République Française 2002: chapter 3) also recognizes that “the abolition of distances, the downgrading of borders and the development of terrorism as a type of war contributes to a partial erasure of the boundaries between internal and external security,” making internal policing a key component of national security policy. French plans to upgrade forces for international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations further highlight the importance of policing operations to French security planning.

The picture is similar in Latin America. Indeed, Brazil’s new security dilemma—trying to justify the military establishment’s existence in a stable region—has led the military to redefine itself as a police apparatus. Thus, Brazil uses its military forces primarily to combat drug trafficking, to participate in international peacekeeping forces, and to provide public security to its larger cities, particularly Rio de Janeiro (Brazil 2002). Although, the Argentine military doctrine prioritizes traditional defense, it acknowledges that “there are other missions derived from the new demands posed by the strategic scenario.” These include “involvement in peacekeeping operations . . . under the mandate of International Organizations; [and] [i]nvolvement in domestic security operations under the terms of Act 24059 [requiring the military to support local police forces]” (Argentina n.d.: part IV, chapter IX, section 2). In stable regions, then, domestic and international policing is a growing responsibility of national security establishments.

With regard to interaction with nonstate actors (Proposition 8), none of the leading regional powers we investigated made any reference to outsourcing or relying on private security organizations in their military doctrines. Some, however, made brief mention of coordinating their activities with NGOs. The British Defense White Paper, for example, concludes that “joint (and coalition) thinking must be the foundation of doctrine, with a shift in emphasis over the period from joint to fully integrated, inter-agency operations, involving OGDs and NGOs” (United Kingdom 2001b). In addition, the Argentine White Paper discusses cooperation between the armed forces and environmental NGOs (Argentina n.d.: part III, chapter VII, section 5). It is clear, though, that partnerships between national security establishments and nongovernmental actors are rarer than globalization theorists would expect for this category of states.8

With respect to regional institutions (Proposition 9), the defense doctrines of states in stable regions all emphasize cooperation with regional security institutions as central to the pursuit of security. The leading European states appear to disagree, however, on which regional security institutions are most relevant. British doctrine prioritizes NATO over all other institutions and views it as “the cornerstone of our collective security.” It also commits itself to strengthening the EU’s

8One notable exception to this statement is the Andean Regional Initiative, which relies on private security companies together with US troops to provide security and stop the drug trade.
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and identifies a number of institutions that foster stability, including the UN, the World Trade Organization, the G7 and G8, the OECD, and the OSCE, but clearly NATO is the institution that London values most (United Kingdom 2001d). In contrast, France gives strategic priority to the European Union as a security institution, which it views as “the basis of collective defense in Europe” (République Française 2002:chapter 1). Characteristically, though, the French emphasize that they must retain their freedom to participate in allied operations or act independently (see République Française 2002:chapter 3). But this disagreement should not obscure the fact that all of the Western European countries count on multilateral security institutions of one sort or another to maintain their security.

Latin American states vary in their emphasis on regional security institutions, perhaps because they are not as well institutionalized or developed as those in Europe. Argentina regards the Organization of American States, the Rio Group, and the Contadora Process—with their dispute resolution and peacekeeping mechanisms—as critical institutions for maintaining regional stability. In addition, it views the enlargement of Mercosur as “an element of stability” and “an important tool to face the new global challenges” (Argentina n.d.:part I, chapter II, sections 1 and 2). Brazil acknowledges Mercosur and the establishment of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic as significant developments in the South American security environment (Brazil 1996:section I, paragraph 2.10). Nonetheless, the rest of Brazil’s defense policy makes little mention of regional institutions in the pursuit of Brazilian defense. So, even though there is some regional variation, it is clear that states in stable regions include regional institutions as an important component of their national defense plans.

The above discussion of regional powers in stable regions indicates considerably more support for the globalization school’s ideas than did the previous discussion of what the major powers were doing and saying. In particular, regional powers in stable regions have embraced new threats and integrated regional security institutions to a greater degree than the major powers. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that they are reducing their armed forces, cooperating significantly with nonstate actors, or abandoning their focus on traditional interstate wars.

Regional States in Enduring Rivalries
The states of South Asia, ever on the verge of interstate war, have primarily geared their military strategies to waging traditional style interstate wars with both conventional and nuclear arsenals (Propositions 1 and 2). Nonetheless, there is some variation in the degree to which their military apparatuses have engaged in preparation for low-intensity conflicts. Pakistani military policy focuses almost exclusively on waging a war against India, on the premise that “if we lower our defenses below a certain threshold we could be facing the spectre of extinction” (Ismat 2000). Indian policy is more complex, given that it is complicated by a rivalry, although less intense, with China and the fear of insurgency in Kashmir. Therefore, it supplements its focus on interstate wars with an emphasis on containing local insurgencies and small-scale border wars (Kanwal n.d.).

In the Middle East, most states have attempted to retain the capacity to wage both traditional interstate wars and also smaller scale wars and counterinsurgencies. Israel, faced with two major Palestinian intifadas (uprisings) in the West Bank and Gaza since the mid-1980s, must not only prepare its armed forces for a major interstate war, but also for a day-to-day counterinsurgency (Rodman 2001). Egypt continues to prepare for the possibility, however remote, of a war with Israel, although, as a moderate Arab regime, it must also be wary of a potential Islamist uprising. Even Iran, whose defense minister makes no mention of counterinsurgencies or low-intensity conflicts in his comments on Iranian military doctrine
(Iranian Defense Minister 2003), nonetheless has had occasion to use its military against widespread student protests in 2003. Thus, states in unstable regions continue to prepare primarily for interstate war as well as for conflicts of lesser intensity.

Many of these conflict-ridden states also face the threat of terrorism and extremism and, therefore, the need to deal with post-industrial warfare. Traditionally, India has encountered Kashmiri separatists who use terrorist tactics both within Kashmir and elsewhere in India. No state, however, has suffered more from terrorism than Israel. Since the mid-1960s, groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have conducted bombing campaigns against Israeli civilians both in territories across the Green Line and within the pre-1967 borders. Egypt, too, has had to deal with its share of domestic terrorism, much of which has targeted foreign tourists (Tal 1998). What is interesting is that current Pakistani participation in the US-led war against terrorism has led it, too, to fear a backlash by Muslim extremists and to battle terrorism domestically, although terrorism still remains part of Pakistan’s strategy in its conflict with India over Kashmir. Thus, of all the regimes in unstable regions we investigated, Iran is the only country that has not suffered from terrorism to any significant degree nor been interested in preparing to combat it, despite its Defense Minister’s (2003) claim that Iran is preparing its forces to combat “state terrorism.”

For Proposition 3 regarding the changing nature of threats, not surprisingly, states facing existential crises continue to prioritize traditional security threats over new ones. In the Middle East, Israeli military doctrine (Israeli Defense Forces n.d.) identifies the following missions: “To defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state of Israel; [t]o protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten daily life.” The doctrine makes no reference to organized crime, medical threats, drug trafficking, or economic threats except insofar as it acknowledges that mobilization should be conducted in a manner that does not overtax the fragile Israeli economy (Rodman 2001). Egyptian security policy is similarly cast in terms of preventing war, protecting sovereignty, and defending against aggression without mention of new threats (AMI International 2001). In contrast, Iran (Iranian Defense Minister 2003) addresses “a broad spectrum of threats,” including “foreign aggression, war, border incidents, espionage, sabotage, regional crises derived from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and state terrorism.” In essence, however, only organized crime fits in the category of “new security” threats; in effect, the defense capabilities that Iran is pursuing are geared primarily toward military style threats.

In south Asia, Pakistani security goals remain focused on military threats from India and threats to domestic order by Islamic extremist groups. Little attention in official policy pronouncements is devoted to new security threats. And even though India clearly faces a variety of nontraditional threats (environmental security, food security, organized crime, and the drug trade), Indian security officials continue to focus primarily on traditional military challenges (Kanwal n.d.). Thus, none of the leading states in these troubled regions has shifted its focus to address what are considered to be the “new security” threats.

Regarding defense spending (Proposition 4), there has been an increase in the military expenditures of most states involved in enduring rivalries. In the Middle East, regional spending fell from $70.7 billion in 1991 to under $48 billion in 1995, but then shot up again to over $72 billion in 2001. Moreover, leading regional antagonists, such as Israel ($7.8 billion to $9.1 billion), Saudi Arabia ($15.5 billion to an estimated $26.6 billion), and Iran ($3.6 billion to $11.5 billion) increased their defense budgets considerably during the decade. In addition, with respect to manpower (Proposition 5), armed forces in the region actually rose from 2.5 million in 1985 to almost 3.5 million in 1988, before stabilizing at just under 2.9 million people in active service by 2001.
South Asian military spending increased steadily over the last decade. In 1991, the region spent over $11 billion on defense; by 2001, that figure had increased to over $17 billion—an increase of over 50 percent. Manpower in the region also increased from over 2.1 million in 1985 to a high of over 2.6 million, before stabilizing at over 2.3 million active servicemen in 2001. There were, however, interesting variations among the principal regional rivals. During this period, India increased its military spending (from over $7.2 billion to $12.9 billion) but decreased its manpower (from 1.26 million to 1.15 million). Conversely, Pakistani military spending gradually declined from $3.3 billion to under $3.2 billion, but its armed forces swelled from 482,800 to 620,000. In effect, states engaged in enduring rivalries have not cut back on their armed forces as globalization theorists would expect.

In the contemporary era, states in troubled regions all couch their official statements on national security in defensive and deterrent terms (Proposition 6). Their broader foreign policies and their behavior in the military theater, however, suggest the potential for offense. In South Asia, the leading regional competitors both have defensive and deterrent declaratory policies on national defense, but they do not completely exclude offensive options. According to the draft Indian nuclear doctrine of August 17, 1999, for example, the purpose of Delhi’s nuclear arsenal is to “pursue a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence” and no first use of nuclear weapons (India 1999). Its official conventional forces doctrine is defensive, retaining as objectives national defense, confidence-building measures, arms control, and dialogue with other major powers (India n.d.). Nonetheless, with ongoing insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir encouraged by forces in Pakistan and counterterrorist operations against Pakistani-based militant groups, it is possible that the Indian doctrine of defense and deterrence could lead to a wider confrontation with its regional rival. Pakistani strategy, recognizing that its conventional forces are too weak for a direct challenge to India, relies on its small nuclear arsenal to deter an Indian conventional offensive (Ismat 2000). Indeed, official Pakistani policy is defensive and designed to “restore the strategic balance in the interest of peace and security in South Asia” (Pakistan n.d.-b). In practice, though, Pakistan’s commitment “to extend full political, diplomatic, and moral support to the legitimate Kashmiri struggle for their right to self-determination” could amount to an attempt to change the status quo by lower level military challenges and, therefore, is potentially offensive (Pakistan n.d.-a). Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine relies on “first use” against a possible conventional attack by India and, therefore, is offensive in nature, although Pakistan’s aim may be deterrence against a conventional attack by India.

In the Middle East, declaratory doctrine is similarly defensive, although the potential for offense clearly exists. The Israeli Government, for example, states that its military doctrine is “defensive on the strategic level” with “no territorial ambitions,” resting on the conventional superiority of the Israeli Defense Forces and whatever unconventional weapons it may possess (Israel Defense Forces n.d.). Nonetheless, given that the first principle of Israeli security policy is that the country cannot afford to lose a war, it is possible that regional changes could lead to preemptive strikes such as the 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor or limited strikes on state sponsors of terrorism, such as the strike against Syria in 2003. In addition, the Sharon Government has been willing to reoccupy areas under Palestinian Authority control temporarily in response to terrorist attacks.

Other leading Middle Eastern states also report defensive postures. Most credibly, Egypt—which is attempting to solidify its relationship with Washington and rebuild its
economy—sets as its strategic priorities to “prevent war and contribute to the stability and peaceful development in the region; [p]rotect the sovereignty of all territories and territorial boundaries within its international borders; [m]aintain the integrity, security, and stability of the country; and [d]efend itself against any act of aggression” (AMI International 2001). For its part, regional participant Iran also claims to pursue a policy of “strategic deterrent defense” against unspecified threats. Its open support of Hizbullah strikes against Israel from Lebanon and its growing military arsenal including submarines, warships, Shihab ballistic missiles, and, many suspect, nuclear capabilities, though suggest an offensive dimension to Iranian policy (Iranian Defense Minister 2003). In sum, even though the declaratory policies of states in enduring rivalries conform to the globalization school’s expectations, there are reasons to doubt the defensive orientations of these troubled states.

Given that many states in unstable regions have to contend with terrorist threats, their national security apparatuses typically engage in policing type activities to combat terrorism (Proposition 7). Consequently, although they do not dwell upon these missions in their official statements on defense policy, there is every reason to believe that they are part of the military establishment’s purpose. This pattern, however, existed well before the onset of globalization (Hoffman 1998:chapter 2). Regarding nonstate actors (Proposition 8), we found no evidence that leading states in enduring rivalries outsource their security policies or rely significantly on NGOs. The only significant use of nonstate actors to achieve security goals would be the tacit and often explicit support for terrorist organizations by the governments of Syria, Iran, and Pakistan.

With respect to Proposition 9 (regional institutions), states embroiled in enduring rivalries do not put much faith in regional security frameworks. South Asia, as a region, lacks the kind of ambitious, overarching, regional security institutions that exist in other regions of the world. The South Asian Regional Cooperation forum does not deal with security questions and is stymied in other areas as well because of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. As a result, even if the leading states in the region wanted to pursue security and stabilize competition through regional institutions, they could not do so. Consequently, India and Pakistan use traditional self-help strategies, relying on their own armed forces and, at times, interested third parties to secure themselves.

In the Middle East, too, there are no overarching institutions that can provide stability. Because few Arab states recognize Israel, it is excluded from the institutions that do exist. Therefore, Israel relies on itself and external allies—notably the United States—to secure itself in a hostile environment. The main Arab security institution is the Arab League, an organization designed to foster cooperation between Arab states, defend their sovereignty, and advance common Arab goals (see the Arab League Charter at Avalon Project 2003). This institution has largely been stymied by geopolitical competition among its members and, therefore, has been largely ineffective as a regional security organization (see Sela 1997). Instead, the Arab states largely rely on themselves and on ad hoc coalitions to pursue their security interests.

Thus, aside from their increased use of policing type operations, states in regions with enduring rivalries have not altered their national security establishments as globalization theorists predicted.

Weak States

With regard to the changing nature of wars and post-industrial warfare (Propositions 1 and 2), the sub-Saharan African region has witnessed an explosion of low-intensity conflicts in the last 15 years. Indeed, because many of its states lack both capacity and legitimacy, they are unable to curtail civil wars (such as those in Angola and the former Zaire), tribal warfare (like the war between the Hutus and the Tutsis that spilled from Rwanda and Burundi into the former Zaire and
Uganda), and battles by local militias (such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia). As Jeffrey Herbst (2003:166) has observed, the prevalence of civil and tribal wars has eroded the possibility of African states emerging as strong entities, unlike the European state formation experience. As a result, only a few African countries have been successful in mobilizing their populations for external war. These problems are compounded by easy access of these groups to the international arms trade, especially with the wealth generated by the sale of conflict diamonds. Only a few African wars (the most prominent of which was the recently ended war between Ethiopia and Eritrea) resembled traditional interstate warfare. Moreover, because most of the warring African groups have lacked the resources to wage continuous conventional war, they frequently have targeted civilians, businesses, and other soft targets with guerrilla tactics. Thus, although many of these groups are not ideologically motivated (an exception is UNITA in Angola), their campaigns can be classed as post-industrial warfare (or, perhaps more accurately, pre-industrial warfare). In effect, the region that has benefited least from globalization has been most affected by the transformation in warfare that globalization theorists predict.

And, indeed, African states have certainly faced a host of nontraditional threats (Proposition 3). To begin with, they are underdeveloped and their populations suffer from debilitating poverty. Moreover, they are increasingly ravaged by the threat of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. At the end of 2001, sub-Saharan Africa contained nearly 28 million or 70 percent of the world’s total HIV/AIDS patients. The 12 Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states have the highest HIV-prevalence rate in the world (20.6 percent of the population) and the sub-Saharan Africa region has 9 percent against a world rate of 1.2 percent (Pharaoh and Schonteich 2003). Thus in Africa, to some extent, conflict patterns are changing with old and new security threats converging and coalescing in one fashion or other. Nonetheless, facing the constant peril of rebellion and civil war, the weak states of sub-Saharan Africa frequently do not have the luxury of defining their security in terms of nontraditional security threats. Their overriding security priority is to combat rebel forces and repel challenges to national sovereignty from neighboring states. Although it is true that improving economic circumstances and containing the spread of pandemics could reduce the likelihood of rebellion, failed state leaders rarely concern themselves with the basic needs of their population, instead enriching themselves at the population’s expense (see Rotberg 2002:127–140). New security threats, therefore, have only a limited influence on their national security efforts.

With respect to Propositions 4 and 5 (defense spending and manpower), in sub-Saharan Africa, official governmental military spending has fluctuated in the past decade. In 1991, it stood at $9.3 billion, but it dropped steadily to $6.5 in 1998, before rising to $9.8 billion by the turn of the millennium. The recent increase is, no doubt, driven by the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the civil war in Angola, and other ongoing conflicts that flared up at the end of the 1990s. Thus, for example, defense spending in Eritrea increased from $95.3 million in 1993 to $167 million in 1999. In Ethiopia, it shot up sixfold from an estimated $123 million in 1992 to $730 million in 2000. Angola doubled its defense budget from $1.2 billion

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10One might argue that the war in the Great Lakes region involving the Congo exhibited some characteristics of a conventional war, but it was, at core, a struggle between ethnic groups vying for domination in which troops from seven different African countries participated (Martin 2002:199–204).

11We do not report the same countries for the defense expenditure and manpower portions of this section because data on many of the failed African states is scarce and, at times, contradictory. Thus, we provide what we can to give a picture of developments in the region.

12Of course, these figures would be higher if they included arms purchases by the nongovernmental militias, gangs, and chieftains that plague the region.
in 1992 to $2.4 billion in 1999. Other failed states, however, such as Sierra Leone ($23.6 million in 1992, $9.6 million in 1999), Rwanda ($108 million in 1992, almost $76 million in 2000), and Côte d’Ivoire ($116 million in 1992, $97 million in 1997), actually reduced their official governmental defense budgets. Official armed forces manpower in the region also increased by half from 958,000 in 1985 to over 1.4 million in 2001. This should, perhaps, come as no surprise given that increasing defense budgets in a poor region that cannot take advantage of modern military technology can only imply larger armies. It is clear, though, that the failed states have not reduced their militaries as globalization theorists would have expected.

We were unable to locate clear statements of military doctrine and national security strategy from the weak or failed states in sub-Saharan Africa (Proposition 6). Nonetheless, given that these states cannot afford the most sophisticated modern technology and live with the constant fear of war and rebellion, there is no reason to expect that the forces of globalization have made their military establishments defensive and deterrent in nature. Indeed, in 2000, Africa contained the largest number of conflicts of any region of the world (Department for International Development 2001:8). The sheer magnitude of these conflicts suggests that at least some African states have adopted offensive military polices. Moreover, the active involvement of several states in the Great Lakes regional conflict suggests that many African states are seeking to prevent the spread of low-intensity conflicts to their territory through outward-looking, offensive type strategies. In the absence of more concrete evidence, then, we have reason to doubt the globalization school’s proposition that national militaries in these states are abandoning offensive strategies for defensive and deterrent ones.

With regard to a shift from war-fighting to policing (Proposition 7), in states that lack legitimacy, maintaining domestic order is often the military establishment’s primary purpose. Thus, the national armed forces of Zimbabwe, Angola, Congo, and other failed African states are, in effect, brutal police forces at the service of corrupt governments. It would be difficult to attribute this phenomenon to globalization, though. After all, corrupt African governments have long used their national security establishments to maintain their domestic power positions. If anything, globalization should restrain these police actions by bringing international pressure to bear against regimes that abuse human rights, which does not appear to be the case.

Regarding nonstate actors (Proposition 8), the weak and failed states of Africa, lacking the resources to maintain effective fighting forces, are increasingly relying on private security personnel to fight rebels and defend their governments, their supporters, and their institutions. These private military companies, such as “Executive Outcomes” and “Sandline International,” are actively involved in South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Angola. In 1995 the government of Sierra Leone contracted with Executive Outcomes to suppress the resistance by rebel forces (Cillers and Mason 1999:1–9). Multinational corporations (including most of the foreign and local mining companies), insurgents, and criminal groups in this chaotic region also use private security forces to protect themselves and their property because the states’ own military and police forces often lack the capacity to perform these functions (Howe n.d.). Furthermore, as they are unable to achieve their security goals independently, governments and peoples of the region look to NGOs to assist them in providing food, medicine, and world attention, all of which can foster greater stability. As a result, globalization has led weak states to embrace nongovernmental security providers to a greater extent than any other category of states.

13In effect, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between African armies and police forces. Police forces in the region are typically quasi-military and both groups have low status and are prone to violence and abuse of power (Lock 1999:11–36).
There are only a few regional security institutions in Africa (Proposition 9). The most notable, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—and its new variant, the African Union (AU)—was designed to foster cooperation between the African states, protect their sovereignty, and resolve disputes between them (see Vogt 1996). In addition, there are regional economic organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its armed monitoring group—and SADC, which also have attempted to promote regional stability and security. Other regional institutional efforts have included the initiative by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—comprising Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda—to end the Sudanese conflict. As there are no widely available national security doctrines for the weak states of sub-Saharan Africa, it is difficult to evaluate the degree to which they rely on the OAU and the economic groups to achieve their security goals. Because the members of these institutions are states and because they have historically supported governments against rebels, it is reasonable to assume that they do value the OAU and the economic institutions (see Peck 1998:155–172). Nonetheless, the general picture remains that, despite a mushrooming of regional institutions and some limited successes, African states have not been able to engage in effective collective security management under the auspices of regional security institutions because of the weak state syndrome (Zartman 2003:81–103).

On the whole, then, the weak and failed states category presents mixed evidence for the globalization school’s theories. These states clearly have changed the type of wars they fight and have reached out to nonstate actors and institutions to help them achieve their security objectives. They have not, however, reduced their armed forces or defense expenditures nor have they abandoned traditional security concerns to address new threats.

An Uneven Picture

Employing our fourfold framework to assess the impact of globalization on the national security state, we come to two main conclusions. The conclusions are evident in Table 1. First, there is little evidence that globalization has transformed the pursuit of national security. States still endeavor to protect themselves with traditional national military apparatuses and privilege traditional defense activities over combating the “new security” threats that globalization theorists emphasize. Indeed, most states in each of the categories, except the weakest states of Africa, retain a doctrinal focus on traditional interstate wars even if some of them are increasingly confronting low-intensity challenges. As far as doctrine is concerned, only among stable regions do we find a clear trend away from offense. In other categories of states, strategic circumstances seem to be a greater determinant of strategy and doctrine than globalization. Except in stable regions (and, perhaps, in weak or failed states), there would appear to be little support for the proposition that states rely on regional security organizations to achieve their security goals. Great powers do look to these institutions, but only to a limited degree, and states in conflictual regions find them to be largely irrelevant. Moreover, the globalization proposition about defense spending fails across all four categories of states; defense budgets continue to reflect strategic conditions rather than the pressures of globalization.

Furthermore, in some areas (such as the identification of new security threats) in which we did find limited support for the globalization school’s propositions, it was clear that these concessions to the new security environment were complementary to traditional security missions rather than a replacement for them. Of all the globalization school’s propositions, only its predictions about an increasing focus on policing operations and post-industrial warfare are borne out across the categories
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositions</th>
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<th>Stable Regions</th>
<th>Enduring Rivalries</th>
<th>Failed States</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: shift to low-intensity conflicts</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Somewhat consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: shift to post-industrial warfare</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Somewhat consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Somewhat consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: face new threats</td>
<td>No trend</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Somewhat consistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: lower defense budgets</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>No trend</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5: less manpower</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>No trend</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>P6: defensive doctrines</td>
<td>No trend</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Somewhat consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7: shift to policing actions</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8: privatize to non-state actors</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Largely inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Largely inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9: pursue through regional institutions</td>
<td>Partially consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Consistent with proposition</td>
<td>Inconsistent with proposition</td>
<td>Partially consistent with proposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of states we examined—primarily international reactions to the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Second, to the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes of globalization most. Facing no real existential threats, they have been able to broaden their conceptions of security to include a range of nontraditional threats such as to the environment and the economy. They have been able to adopt defensive postures and rely increasingly on regional security organizations and alliances. In contrast, states in regions with enduring conflicts have been least affected by the pressures of globalization. Because war remains a real and threatening possibility, they continue to maintain large, well-funded military apparatuses and they resist the pull of regional security arrangements, preferring to secure themselves. Even though such states are increasingly engaged in police actions and counterterrorism operations, they prioritize traditional defense related activities over the environment, the economy, and other “new security” issues.

The major powers have responded in a mixed fashion depending upon the threats and opportunities they face. In the contemporary environment, all of them have made fighting terrorism one of the primary purposes of their security establishments. But the United States has used its war on terrorism to craft a new offensive military doctrine in contrast to the more defensive, deterrent, and internally oriented doctrines followed by Russia and, to some extent, China. The United States also relies on multilateral alliances and institutions to advance its security interests to a greater extent than Russia or China, although it is willing to act independently if these institutions fail to advance Washington’s goals. In addition, US military doctrine emphasizes other nontraditional security threats to a far greater extent than do those of Russia or China, although these clearly take a backseat to nuclear and conventional defense and fighting terrorism. For its part, China has continued to increase its military spending and, to a limited degree, its manpower, whereas its counterparts have cut manpower and, at least until 2001, reduced defense spending. It would seem, therefore, that the great powers have remained traditional national security states, embracing globalization in the security theater only when compelled to do so (as in the case of terrorism), in rather secure threat environments (for example, Russian and US defense spending), and when doing so offers them potential advantages (for example, the episodic US reliance on multilateral security institutions). The very weak or failed states, however, have been profoundly affected by globalization despite the fact that they benefit least from it. The pressures of globalization have altered their national security environments by pushing them to look to private actors, such as private security firms, NGOs, and international institutions to provide their security. Nonetheless, we cannot blame globalization for the collapse of sub-Saharan Africa’s national security establishments. State failure, rather than globalization, seems to be the principal cause of the crisis of the national security state in Africa.

Thus, we conclude that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, but unevenly and, in most cases, only at the margins. It has expanded the scope of threats that national security establishments contend with and the range of instruments they use to combat these threats, but—except to some extent among states in stable regions—globalization has not altered the primary emphasis of states on traditional security matters nor has it dramatically altered the architecture of the national security state.

**Implications for Future Research**

The advance of globalization has been rapid, but it is, nevertheless, a fairly new phenomenon. Only since the end of the Cold War has the world become truly globalized, although the trends began much earlier. Therefore, our findings must
be considered preliminary. It remains possible that sustained globalization will eventually reshape national security establishments in line with the globalization school's expectations. It is also possible that national and international backlashes against globalization could have countervailing effects on the pursuit of national security. Thus, additional study of this topic is essential. This essay has important implications for such future analysis of globalization and other transnational phenomena on not only the national security apparatus but on the foreign policy-making units within states.

First, scholars should avoid painting all states with broad-brush arguments. It makes no sense to assume that transnational phenomena will affect the weak and the small, the wealthy and the poor, the secure and the threatened equally. Instead, scholars must differentiate between states taking into account not only their relative power but also their specific regional challenges and interests. In this regard, the categories of states presented in this essay provide a useful first cut at examining the differential impact of globalization. It might prove fruitful as well to consider how differences in gross national product, rates of dependence on international trade, type of political regime, and other potentially significant unit-level variables affect the degree and manner in which national security establishments respond to globalization.

Second, even though most of the emerging research on globalization and national security is cast at the broad theoretical level with occasional anecdotal support, a comprehensive empirical focus is essential. Otherwise, there is a risk of sweeping overgeneralizations. For example, a glance at defense spending levels in Europe in the 1990s would ostensibly support the proposition that globalization was reducing defense expenditures. Such a conclusion, however, would obscure both the fact that South Asia and Latin America were steadily increasing their levels of expenditures and the eventual European increases in the twenty-first century. Only with a careful, comparative analysis of trends across countries, regions, and time periods can scholars reach meaningful conclusions about the impact of transnational phenomena in national contexts.

Third, it is imperative for researchers to sift out the effects of alternative explanations. Focusing solely on indicators of change—such as levels of military spending—might lead to a faulty judgment about the causes of change. Instead, the research design should allow the scholar to trace the separate effects of different potential causes. Thus, even though in this essay we have observed that national security establishments in the weak states of sub-Saharan Africa are fragmented in the contemporary era, it would be useful to examine the degree to which this phenomenon can be attributed to state failure, poverty, and domestic political conditions rather than globalization. Similarly, pre-September 11, trends toward lower defense spending in Europe and the United States could be the result of globalization or merely an artifact of the end of the Cold War and worldwide US hegemony. Scholars should devise more careful tests, perhaps relying on interviews with policymakers to determine which of these separate factors has the greater causal weight.

Fourth, scholars of globalization might wish to frame their studies differently. Even though much of the globalization literature is cast as an epitaph for the state (for example, Ohman 1994), it might be more appropriate for scholars to focus on the state's reactions to the novel challenges of globalization. The state, as an institution, has shown remarkable resilience, adapting over the years to many technological and international challenges—such as the industrial revolution, the rapid expansion of interstate commerce, and the development of nuclear weapons (Gilpin 2001:362–376; Nayar 2001; Ikenberry 2003:350–372; Weiss 2003). Each of these monumental changes left its indelible mark on the state even though states found ways to adapt and retain their primacy as institutions of territorial control and security providers (Grieco and Ikenberry 2002; Paul, Ikenberry, and Hall
2003; Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004). The key question to be addressed by scholars of globalization and national security is not whether the new challenges of globalization will overwhelm the state but in what ways will they alter the state and what mechanisms will the state use to adapt to global social forces while retaining its centrality.

Fifth, a word about the independent variable is in order. Many scholars of globalization include elements of its hypothesized effects in their conceptualization of this key term. Thus, as Axel Hulsemeyer (2003:3–4) points out, political definitions of globalization emphasize the actions states have taken to adapt to the globalized economic environment, social definitions focus on the redistribution of gains and losses in globalized societies, and cultural definitions consider the degree to which identities are transformed by larger scale interactions. We conclude that to use the term “globalization” meaningfully as a causal variable, scholars must distinguish it conceptually from its effects. Therefore, they should emphasize the rapid expansion of the scale of international politics beyond the level of the state brought about by changes in technology and the phenomena of economic interdependence and transnationalism. In this manner, scholars will avoid muddying the waters by including too much in the package of globalization.

There can be no doubt that globalization is one of the most significant developments in international politics in the contemporary era. It, therefore, behooves us to study it and its effects on a wide range of state activities carefully and systematically in order to move beyond the speculation and imprecise claims that have dominated the literature to date on globalization and national security.

References


