Recasting Statecraft: International Relations and Strategies of Peaceful Change

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

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Much of mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship considers war to be a precondition for significant changes at the systemic level. Peaceful change as a subject has received limited attention in Realism, except by E. H. Carr and Robert Gilpin, although several strategies for stability are present in the paradigm. Mechanisms inherent in Liberalism have offered the most insights on obtaining change without war. Constructivism also focuses on change, caused largely by norms and inter-subjective ideational forces. Yet concrete strategies for peaceful change at the international level remain elusive in much of IR theory. The traditional grand strategy literature has focused most attention on obtaining national objectives through war while ignoring peaceful mechanisms of change and transformation. This article, based on my presidential address at the 57th ISA Convention in Atlanta in March 2016, calls for a reorientation in the grand strategy literature by incorporating strategies of peaceful change. It examines the contributions for peaceful change made by Europe, the United States, and rising and resurgent powers Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, in addition to ASEAN as a regional grouping. The article concludes by asking why some of these countries pursued peaceful strategies of change at various points in time only to abandon them subsequently. The article calls on the IR discipline to think more clearly about strategies for peaceful change and foreign policymakers to adapt and reorient succeeding generations to seek change without violence as a subject matter of serious study.

Introduction

In the summer of 2015 I visited Vienna. There I had the opportunity to view two exhibitions: one observing the 200th anniversary of the Congress of Vienna—which heralded the Concert of Europe—and the other the World War I exhibit at the Vienna Museum of Military History. Both reminded me of the value and need for a strategy of peace—the absence of which can generate extraordinary violence and conflict in the international system.

It was the English scholar E. H. Carr who admonished European leaders to think about peaceful change more seriously in the 1930s. Carr (1964, 222) said in his classic *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*:

> The defence of [the] status quo is not a policy which can be lastingly successful. It will end in war as surely as rigid conservatism will end in revolution. “Resistance to aggression,” however necessary as a momentary device of national policy, is no solution; for readiness to fight to prevent change is just as unmoral as readiness to fight to enforce it. To establish methods of peaceful change is therefore the fundamental problem of international morality and of international politics.

Some five decades later the American scholar Robert Gilpin (1981, 209) argued:

> The basic task of peaceful change is not merely to secure peace; it is to foster change and achieve a peace that secures one’s basic values. Determining how this goal is to be achieved in specific historical circumstances is the ultimate task of wise and prudent statesmanship.

Carr was convinced that peaceful change was possible if revisionist states had the ability to put pressure on the status quo powers and the latter prove willing to make adequate concessions (Carr 1964, 221–22). Gilpin, less convinced of the possibility of peaceful adjustment to power transitions, still considers it the greatest task of statecraft to identify when to appease revisionist powers (Gilpin 1981, 207).
Their words remain relevant. A power-transition conflict involving the United States and China looks increasingly possible. A mini–Cold War has already begun between the West and Russia—in which a declining power seeks to resurrect itself and, it seems, the West aims to undermine its efforts. Such examples highlight how the highest goal of policymakers should be achieving a peaceful transformation of the international system. They need to devise war-avoidance strategies that make peaceful change a reality—especially in the face of rapidly rising powers.

Related scholarship treats war as the main mechanism of change (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). Barring rare exceptions (like Doran 1971), power-cycle and long-cycle theories concur (Modelski and Thompson 1989), as do World Systems Theory and Marxism-Leninism (Lenin 1939; Wallerstein 1974). This emphasis reflects the historical behavior of great powers. Key policymakers only made feeble efforts toward peace during the first half of the twentieth century. Europeans led themselves into war, and its horrendous after-effects lingered on for generations.

Today is a time of major changes in world politics. These are driven by, among other things, the rise of new powers, deepened economic globalization, and the emergence of violent transnational forces. The challenges of transnational terrorism and global warming require cooperation and coordination among all states. Is International Relations (IR) as a discipline offering much in the way of ideas for change without war? I submit that, at least in mainstream IR journals and books, peaceful change as a specific topic receives little explicit attention. While we may have generated many ideas on peace and change in our field, they remain scattered. They do not often reach the right audience—especially policymakers.

The key argument this article makes is that war is neither necessary nor desirable for status accommodation and power transitions in today’s world. Most of the basic grand-strategic principles for securing great-power status and dominance were developed during the yesteryears of imperial and colonial eras. To adapt to the times, both status quo and rising powers must refashion their grand strategies to obtain peaceful change without war. Bargaining through international institutions offers a better avenue for peaceful transition and hence should form the key dimension of the grand strategies of great powers. This is because of three fundamental reasons:

First, in the globalized economic system, autarchy is not a valuable way to obtain one’s economic or security goals. Interdependence in economic, security, and ecological dimensions is much more prevalent in today’s world than when traditional grand-strategic principles were developed.

Second, given the presence of nuclear weapons, war is unlikely to make anyone win or lose in the classical sense. Even if a state gains more in a power-transition war, the victory could accelerate its decline and even demise.

Third, military power has limited purchase when it comes to securing status for rising powers. Hence it is vital for such a power to develop a grand strategy that relies primarily on economic and institutional power to achieve its goals, even when it seeks defensive and deterrent capabilities to offset potential military challenges.

In addition to making these claims, I also stress that ideas of peace and peaceful change come from many parts of the world. The field of IR needs to pay more attention to these different strategies for peace and peaceful change, explore the reasons for their success and failure, and adapt them to contemporary needs.

**Dimensions of Peaceful Change**

There are at least three key dimensions of peaceful change relevant to IR in a positive sense.

The broadest is *global/systemic-level change*, related to power transitions and the peaceful status accommodation of rising powers, as well as the creation of a just world order, as its actual or perceived absence often produces much conflict and violence. Power-transition conflicts arise due to political, economic, military, and technological changes that alter the capabilities of countries. When a critical passage point occurs, the conventional wisdom holds, rising powers engage in cataclysmic wars to advance their position, or declining powers initiate preventive wars to arrest the rise of new powers. During the heyday of the imperial era, the European great powers waged many such violent wars—causing extraordinary conflict and bloodshed in the international system. The question in the contemporary era is whether a peaceful accommodation in power and status positions is possible. Can great powers resort to nonviolent methods to achieve change vis-à-vis their peers as well as smaller powers in the system?

Similar questions are relevant at the *regional level*: that is, change in regional orders from conflict to cooperation and possibilities of producing security communities where stable peace exists and member-states do not envision or prepare for war to settle disputes among themselves (Deutsch 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998). Is regional transformation a linear process, or is it possible to achieve a semblance of order only to return to disorder at different points in time? Some regions are mired in perpetual conflicts or enduring rivalries, and over time, these conflicts could assume societal dimensions involving political parties, business groups, and media (Paul 2012, 5).

Third, at the *domestic level*, positive change denotes improvements to state capacity and democratic order that can have an affirmative impact on international and regional orders. Weak and undemocratic states are often unable to sustain domestic legitimacy and peace. This carries great implications for regional orders (Holsti 1996; Migdal 1988). My primary focus in this article is on strategies at the global level, especially the peaceful accommodation of rising powers.

Why is it important that we understand and cope with systemic change in a meaningful manner? A failure to appreciate change and deal with it constructively can have disastrous consequences, especially if it involves competition among great powers. From a national security perspective, America’s biggest strategic challenge in the years to come is how to accommodate China, Russia, and India—as well as potentially other rising/resurging powers—peacefully. That is, to avoid the so-called “Thucydides Trap” (Allison 2015). A power-transition war will hurt America and precipitate its decline, even if it wins, as happened to Britain after World War II. The challenge for the rising powers is how to attain its objectives without war. War is a high-risk strategy, and challenging the order violently can cause much damage to oneself and the environment. The central claim of this article is that rising powers can gain their objectives without war and that in order to accomplish that goal, these states need grand strategies that call for gradual accommodation and integration rather than outright confrontation. Rising powers such as China and India and resurging power Russia in particular ought to develop national strategies to obtain change in the status quo without war or large-scale violence and create an order that is lasting and that other
members of the international community perceive as legitimate. Peaceful power transition is thus in the rational interests of rising and status quo powers.

Diplomatic and military history tells us that when great powers blindly follow violent strategic logic, disasters can happen. The context of warfare and international politics during the past several centuries made victory the dominant goal of grand strategy. Traditionally, strategy and grand strategy have been about how to attain the objectives of war, and then postwar security through minimum costs to nation-states. Grand strategy is defined by Posen (1984, 13) as "a collection of military, economic and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security," or "a political-military means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can cause security for itself." Liddell Hart (1991, 322) defines grand strategy as a higher strategy meant to "co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of war—the goal defined by fundamental policy." The nuclear age brought about a revolution in strategy, as the absolute or uncontestable weapon encouraged deterrence—that is, preventing war—over offensive or defensive uses of military power as the key basis for strategy (Brodie 1946; Jervis 1989). However, the nuclear discourse largely ignored peaceful change. The focus instead was on status quo preservation through mutual deterrence. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar order occurred without a great power war, and nuclear weapons might have been helpful in preventing a violent transition, but we still have no theory to account for its role in the epochal transformation.

Realism dominates the literature on grand strategy, which, in consequence, focuses on conflict rather than peace. It is understandable why Realist discourse dominated grand strategy in the past during the imperial and Cold War eras, but this is inadequate in the complex globalized world of today and the emerging world of even more complexity in both technology and interstate relations. We need to broaden grand strategy to include statecraft of peace as a definitive dimension of national security doctrines. The big challenge for strategic studies as a subdiscipline is how to broaden statecraft from war and narrow national security and refocus on statecraft of peace. This is not to argue that strategies for war are unnecessary; as long as military forces are present and interstate conflict is possible, strategies of war will exist. But a narrow focus on military dimensions of grand strategy by great powers is dangerous for national and international security. Some strategists defend their craft by arguing that "war cannot be made to disappear simply by ignoring it" (Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray 2013, 10). For pessimists, the only option is to mitigate conflict through effective strategy, and no radical transformation toward perpetual peace is feasible. But a pessimistic take on the inevitability of war and an unwillingness to look into alternative strategies that may prevent war and peacefully transform the conduct of international relations make war a "self-fulfilling prophecy" (Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray 2013, 11).

Structure and Agency

The key to understanding change at the international level is appreciating of the role of both structure and agency. It is a myth that agents, that is, national leaders, have little role in determining the fate of their countries. State elites with either especially poor or grossly clever strategies can often undercut balance of power and deterrence. Ambitious leaders who challenge the status quo and military equilibrium sometimes arise. In fact, an ambitious leader can design around the balance of power and resort to different strategies, including asymmetric ones, to upset it. When leaders think they can break out of their power status even in adversity, they may design clever strategies to change their situation. The assumption is that despite the great uncertainty of the international environment, at least some amount of change is often the product of particular strategies elites hold, and of the specific role key policy entrepreneurs play in implementing those ideas. Structural theories tend to assume continuity, often ignoring non-structural sources of change and continuity.

For instance, during the past two centuries, a major source of social change came from ideologies such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism that offered their own prescriptions for social progress and change (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 3). Adherents of these ideologies followed grand strategies, often violent ones, to further their goals. Similarly, Snyder (1991) identified logrolling by self-serving domestic coalitions as a root cause for the self-defeating expansionist and aggressive policies of European great powers during the industrial age. Despite the value of a focus on structure, often a mix of structural and agency-driven analysis is needed to obtain a deeper understanding of international phenomena such as change.

IR Theory and Peaceful Change

A major challenge for mainstream IR theory is that it has not explicitly dealt with peace as a subject as much as war, let alone peaceful change. The definitional problem of peace is critical here. Is there something about deep peace (Boulding 1978; Miller 2007; Ripsman 2016; Kupchan 2010; Diehl 2016) that is different from ordinary peace or stability? Or is the absence of war or nonexistence of militarized disputes sufficient for peace? Two countries can be at peace even when they have disputes and occasional crises. But the quality of peace between them may be very low, with little or no societal-level interactions. Our focus here is on more than ordinary peace, but peaceful change that is sustainable and long-lasting.

However, the big question that haunts IR paradigms is whether long-term peace and transformation to a peaceful order is achievable or not. Realism in particular is pessimistic on peace or peaceful change, a major reason why strategic studies does not discuss it. Liberalism and Constructivism present more optimistic positions, but as I will discuss later these approaches generate many challenges to actual policymaking. Below I briefly discuss how the major perspectives in IR deal with peaceful change. Although some perspectives focus more on continuities and recurring patterns, peaceful change is still possible and the main paradigms differ on it in terms of causes, explanations, processes, and limits. Agents or mechanisms of change are also different for the paradigms.

Classical Realism offers ideas of prudence for the conduct of statecraft. It calls for focusing on national interests without undue attention to ideology. Morgenthau’s (1960, 584) nine rules of diplomacy are examples of prudent and pragmatic statecraft. Though the premium is on stability, the classical realist admonition is that states need to pursue their genuine security interests and not abstract religious or ideological goals. By recognizing the vital

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1For historical perspectives on instances of peaceful power transitions, see Paul (2016) and Kupchan (2010).
interests of other states, peaceful order is possible. Further, states should realistically assess their own and others’ interests, and there must be a match between goals they pursue and the capabilities they possess (Morgenthau 1960, 561–67; Gilpin 1981, 226; Cashman 2014, 376; Wivel 2016). Alliances are crucial to balance of power and stable international order, and depending on changes in them, peaceful accommodation of rising powers is possible as new allies are accommodated by hegemonic powers for balancing their opponents.

A key challenge is that classical realists produce contradictory positions on war and peace. While there is great faith in balance of power, and in the postwar years in containment and deterrence as the key mechanisms of international and regional order, history shows us that these strategies do not often make peace or peaceful change possible. Balance of power in particular can be both stability-inducing and war-generating. Balance of power aims to preserve the status quo, not change it. There is no real causal connection between status quo and peace, and despite Carr, realism often neglects the unavoidable movement of history (Gulick 1955, 40). A challenger can view containment as highly threatening and can make efforts at countering or breaking it. Deterrence can be order-preserving, with a considerable risk of the strategy failing. Nuclear deterrence, although able to prevent major wars, does not foreclose limited conflicts and prolonged periods of crises between two nuclear-armed adversaries. It thus produces the stability-instability paradox (Snyder 1961): stability at the central-level relationship in terms of absence of major war is made unstable through recurrent crises and limited wars, especially in the periphery, as nuclear-armed adversaries are confident of non-escalation. Moreover, challengers can design around deterrence and threaten the status quo through asymmetric means and sometimes engage in reckless brinkmanship strategies (George and Smoke 1974, 402). Deterrence can also lead to the freezing of the status quo, thus preventing orderly change.

Peaceful change has been relegated to near impossibility in neorealist and offensive realist scholarships. To neorealists, especially Waltz (1979), stability can be achieved if a correct configuration of power exists. Bipolarity is stability-preserving, while multipolarity is not. International politics is characterized by recurring, not changing, patterns. The challenge for statecraft is therefore how to understand change and develop a strategy to cope with it based on the neorealist logic. Nuclear weapons are useful to maintain peace, and selective proliferation may be beneficial for preserving regional stability. This logic of neorealism received a major blow when the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, within a decade of the heyday of neorealist literature. As Wohlforth (2011, 504) argues, neorealism fostered “a bias towards expectations of stability” by adopting a comparative static approach. Neorealism’s close associate, offensive realism, also offers very little by way of peaceful change. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer (2000) warns that in order to ensure their survival, great powers seek power maximization, which often results in conflict and wars between them. The biggest challenge for these perspectives is the powerful empirical example of how the Cold War ended without violence, the peaceful dismantlement of a superpower, and the somewhat peaceful rise of China thus far without generating intense balance-of-power activity. Most of the affected states seem to be pursuing a hedging strategy with soft balancing, limited hard balancing, and diplomatic engagement as instruments to manage China’s rise (Paul 2014). The over-reliance on microeconomic theory and the attendant neglect of historical, ideological, and domestic political factors have made neorealism less useful to predict change, let alone peaceful change (Kirshner 2014, 2–7; Keohane 1986).

Neoclassical Realism offers greater possibilities for peaceful change because it gives more room to agency than other realisms. Its efforts to link systemic forces with unit-level intervening variables may have value in understanding peaceful change at the international level, such as the end of the Cold War (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, 86–87). However, scholars in this vein have not yet produced a cogent literature on peaceful change. Their main focus is on the sources of foreign policy choices countries make. Grand theory is difficult here, as variations in behavior are possible depending on intervening factors, including domestic politics, and individual-level factors such as psychology of decision-makers, and particular ideas the elite hold. However, it must be recognized that among all the realist perspectives, neoclassical realism offers the most opportunity for developing middle-range theories on peaceful change as well as strategies for obtaining change without war.

While realist insights are important for comprehending conflict, they are not extremely useful in understanding peaceful change or the strategies that lead to peace. The theoretical position that systemic/structural forces overtake national choices is often not borne out by international history. The particular grand strategy might be affected by the structure, but this is a two-way process, as grand strategy itself may cause structural changes. Further, globalization as a structural force needs to be considered in the mix. States can engage in power politics through collective mobilization beyond military instruments (Goddard and Nexon 2016), and the utilization of opportunities for power maximization inherent in economic globalization is yet to gain realists’ attention.

Liberalism has offered the most prescriptions on peaceful change of all IR perspectives. Various branches under this school locate the sources of peaceful change within the establishment of the Kantian tripod: international institutions and regimes, economic interdependence among major actors, and democratic norms among all states. States with similar commercial and political interests tend to cooperate for peaceful change (Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 2001). Liberal hegemons, in particular the United States, have created orders where allies are bound together in a constitution-like arrangement through international institutions (Ikenberry 2001). Even if liberalism faces challenges from non-liberal states and authoritarian forces, it can resurrect itself through enlightened leadership and policies (Ikenberry 2011). Institutions can also offer collective security to all member-states, and gradual normative change is possible in this way on the use of force by states to obtain their goals. Economic interdependence can bring peaceful change to state relations through a variety of mechanisms (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Owen 2012; Rosecrance 1986), although it is not quite clear if interdependence per se can produce peaceful change or deter states from fighting. The logic, though, is that the costs of war increase among highly interdependent economies.

The big challenge has to do with the confrontation of the liberal order and non-liberal challengers, as liberals are...
reticent to accord power and status to non-liberal states. This means a peaceful transition to a non-liberal rising power is something difficult to fathom. How can liberal states encourage non-liberal states to accept liberal ideas without violence? Conversely, how can liberal states learn to live with non-liberal states, integrating them into international institutions while accepting that they will remain illiberal? If integration efforts do not succeed, how can liberal states co-exist with non-liberal states? Can liberal states accept non-Western and non-liberal norms, some of which may be peace-generating? Even Kant argues that persuasion is the key, but does not rule out wars in the conversion process of non-liberal states (Doyle 1986). The track record of liberal states toward non-liberal states is not necessarily one of persuasion, but of tense violence. The danger of such wars has existed especially when liberal states pursued their agendas with an intense ideological commitment. Liberalism’s adaptation to twenty-first century conditions has not been always peaceful or justice-driven. Many liberal stalwarts of the past, such as Mills, Bentham, and Wilson, all carried racist attitudes that contemporary liberals try to erase (Walls 2005). Today, Liberalism is pushed into different directions by pressures from right-wing parties and individuals; globalization has unleashed many unintended challenges, especially relating to wealth disparities and social inequalities, that liberalism cannot handle or answer properly. Liberal states in recent years have exhibited conflicting tendencies to use unlimited force to compel others, especially weaker regional challengers, to follow their lead, to use excessive restraint emphasizing non-intervention and moderation, creating a legitimacy deficit (Sorensen 2011). The need for a second Enlightenment and refined liberalism based on cosmopolitanism and progressive global civilization, not just European values, is all the more pressing today, even in Europe, where much of liberal thought arose. This may be vital to integrating different religious and ethnic communities that now migrate to Western countries.

The third dominant IR paradigm, Constructivism, has much to offer for understanding peaceful change. Various strands of constructivism contend that if proper norms, ideas, and practices are developed, peaceful change can take place (Katzenstein 1996; Checkel 1997; Hopf 1998; Kubalkova, Onuf, and Kowert 1998; Wendt 1999; Bukovansky 2016). Norm entrepreneurs have been key to altering some long-standing ideas such as slavery, colonialism, and racial discrimination that were considered appropriate and unshakeable at certain historical periods (Crawford 2004). International institutions can also act as norm entrepreneurs for change (Finnemore 1996). Socialization of states into existing norms is another trajectory through which change and accommodation can take place (Johnston 2007). The rise of the nuclear taboo (Tannenwald 2007) or the tradition of non-use (Paul 2009b) signifies a normative change for nuclear weapons states. The literatures on security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998) and practice theory (Pouliot 2010) are useful here to understand forms of change caused by agency.

There is much merit in Constructivist reasoning. The important question often unanswered, however, is how to translate ideas into long-standing national practices. Furthermore, not all norm entrepreneurs promote peace; some indeed advocate violent norms and even succeed in perpetuating them, for instance in the Middle East and North Africa today. There is only limited scholarship in Constructivism that discusses the rise and persistence of bad norms and practices. Thus, understanding norm transformation, especially positive to negative, is a challenge for this paradigm. There is also a tendency to pick good norms and view Western/liberal norms as the yardstick for norm diffusion, and few non-Western norms are discussed in the Constructivist literature. Further, scholars in this tradition have presented few concrete strategies for policymakers to adopt. In addition, by excessively focusing on the diffusion of Western norms, Constructivist scholarship offers not enough material for normative accommodation among states—recognition and respect for others’ ways of doing things. Sustaining peace or peaceful normative change is another major hurdle. Even democratic societies such as the United States and the European Union are witnessing the resurgence of illiberal ideas today, necessitating a proper explanation. The cyclical nature of the prominence of good and bad norms is another dimension that needs attention. More importantly, Constructivists have yet to produce a compelling theory on power transitions at the systemic level or on how to accommodate rising powers that do not share the same norms and practices as dominant actors. Moreover, how can we translate pluralistic security community ideas into non-Western regions and states, such as China, that do not often subscribe to Western values and norms? If we cannot transfer these norms, can we learn to co-exist and retain the multiple fabrics of normative orders in different regions?

Ideational change is a big part of arguments of theorists like Mueller (1989), who contends that the obsolescence of major wars has come out of change in ideas and social practices. He specifically attributes the decline in great power wars to changing societal attitudes toward war. The phenomenon, somewhat similar to the vanishing of practices such as dueling and slavery, occurred because entrepreneurs of ideas capitalized on growing disillusionment toward war among policymakers and the public in the advanced world in particular (Mueller 1989). Vasquez (1993) argues that Europeans had a peculiar conception about power, and the world wars they fought were largely the product of power politics among them. Following these theorists, changes in ideas and norms will make war the least desirable option for great powers and aspiring great powers. The changing norms on armed conflict thus make it possible for rising powers to seek alternate routes to higher status and allow established powers to integrate them into normative orders that preclude war. Others, such as Elias (2000) and Pinker (2013), look at longer-term historical evolution of peaceful habits and practices and the civilizing process among humans from ancient to modern. The challenge here is to explain why avoidable violence accompanied these long-term processes and examine what strategies would have prevented bloodshed and aggression during those epochs. Will the civilizing process continue without war? A major weakness of these theories is the excessive focus on the European great power system and neglect of the rising powers from non-European regions, especially Asia.

Alternative theories, including those offered by post-structural and post-positivist scholars, force us to think about problems with existing theories and belief systems. In addition, calls for change reverberate in post-colonial and feminist
literatures. Their contributions offer a great deal of value for thinking about change at the macro- and microfoundational levels of international relations. Cox (1981, 128), for instance, has offered criticism of “problem-solving theory” that “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework of action.” He favors “Critical theory,” which “does not take institutions and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1981, 129; see also Smith 1999). But critical theorists rarely offer alternative policy prescriptions, and we do not know if the alternative propositions critical theorists imply in their analyses will work to obtain change without violence. As I see it, linking critical and problem-solving theories is a major challenge here, as they are often presented as binaries and in oppositional terms. Similarly, peace studies scholarship has attempted to deal with peaceful change, especially its normative foundations. These contributions include analysis of negative peace, pertaining to the elimination of direct violence, and positive peace, relating to the eradication of indirect or structural violence (see Galtung 1964; Diehl 2016). Unfortunately, some of these approaches were marginalized in the United States, in particular during the Cold War era, largely because of the activism attached to them. Although reverberations of these approaches can be found in the human security literature (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 202–5), the time for resurrecting peace studies as a serious subdiscipline is overdue. In order to gain new traction, peace studies scholars should develop concrete strategies for changing interstate and interstate relations between established and rising powers, as they attempted to do for the superpowers during the Cold War era.8

Strategy Is Not All about War or Narrow National Security

Historically, the term “strategy” got a bad rap as how cunning and crafty military planners think about war and its prosecution, largely because of the classical European strategists whose ideas led to two world wars and the Cold Warriors whose prescriptions steered the world to a major arms race and the possibility of a global nuclear catastrophe. Although a global war was avoided, strategic studies still leaves room for understanding change without war. Think of economics or management as disciplines talking about causes of abstract market phenomena only or focusing exclusively on disruptive economic changes. What makes both disciplines appealing is that they offer solutions to economic and business problems along with abstract theories. IR appears reticent to do so. Strategic studies ended up as a subdiscipline of IR concerned about narrow military dimensions. For too long we have relegated strategic planning to a small group of individuals in political and military leadership who often have a peculiar way of looking at the world. Imagine what they can do: it was a small ideologically oriented decision-making team in Washington, driven by groupthink, that led the country to a disastrous war in the Middle East in 2003, the consequences of which are still haunting the world today.

Western strategic thought during the past 125 years or so has been heavily influenced by Clausewitz, Jomini, and others who believed in the “cult of the offensive” (Van Evera 1984). Clausewitz’s (1976, 77, 227) dictums such as “complete disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare” had historically done much harm to the prospects of peaceful change. One can see parallels today in strategies such as “full spectrum dominance” of the US military (Kinross 2009, 190–91). Although Clausewitz himself recognized that war is context-dependent, later interpretations of Clausewitzian notions encouraged military strategists to seek decisive victory and place excessive emphasis on actual use of force, an aversion to defensive warfare, and war as conflict between nationalities (Luttwak 1976, xi–xii). Deterrence theorists such as Schelling (2008) attempted to explore the non-coercive use of military power even though war-winning and counterforce strategies remained dominant in US nuclear planning (Jervis 1985). Today facing a China with its own Sun Tzu logic with Clausewitzian ideas may produce potentially deadly consequences. The weapons of mass destruction make ultimate victory impossible in the contemporary era, as the victor may end up losing in a nuclear war. Indeed, critiques of deterrence theory made this point in many of their writings (Jervis 1976; Stein 2009; Morgan 2003). Or, as Liddell Hart (1991, 353) stated, if the peace that is obtained after a war is a bad peace, it can create germs of the next war. We need to appreciate that military strategy today has become very complex, along with the rise of a complex international system. Caused by fluidity of the system, there is ambiguity about the type of actors, their power relationships, and their motives, which make credible threats or commitments, the two hallmark conditions for deterrence success, not always feasible (Paul 2009a).

Deepened economic globalization further limits the ability of states to undertake military actions against one another without incurring major costs. All major and aspiring powers—especially the United States, China, and India—are increasingly tied to each other through trade, investment, and other instruments of globalization. As we approach the third decade of the twenty-first century, one thing is clear: a country planning war using worn-out ideas of grand strategy may win its wars but lose the peace. Great powers—including the United States, Russia, Britain, and France—that unnecessarily destroy regional orders are often driven by archaic strategic ideas. As war as a system-changing mechanism is fast becoming anachronistic, a rethinking of grand strategy has become all the more important. How can we adapt to the twenty-first century, and how can states, especially big powers, achieve their goals without war?

Statecraft for Peaceful Change

We need to encourage our discipline and foreign policymakers in major powers in particular to think about peaceful change more effectively. This would mean scholars discussing the policy relevance of their works, especially how they deal with change. The philosophical tendency, especially in the West, is to look at war and peace as a continuum. Statecraft and grand strategy are historically
studied as managing the continuation, termination, and absence of war, and peaceful change is not treated as an independent subject of statecraft (Herrera 2009).

Understanding broader approaches to peace and peaceful change would also mean universities hiring and promoting scholars with different perspectives and methods. We need realists, liberals, post-modernists, and constructivists under the same roof to debate issues and teach students divergent ideas and arguments. We need scholars of qualitative, quantitative, and formal methods. Privileging one over the other (as is happening in many schools today) has long-term consequences for the discipline and how we research and teach it. We need to encourage scholars to think with historical understanding about which strategy produced conflict and which strategy generated unnecessary violence while accepting the contextual variance. Macro- and micro-level forces that generated war and peace need to be identified more clearly. Psychological theories are relevant here as well (see Jervis 1976). Better bargaining theories are needed. Strategies such as Osgood’s Graduated Reduction in International Tensions (GRIT) (Osgood 1962; Collins 1998) need to be resurrected in the discourse more often so that major power rivalries can be prevented from emerging or escalating.

The foundation of peaceful statecraft emphasizes preventing war and at the same time encourages peaceful conflict management techniques in interstate relations. Moreover, strategy should include peace-building and trust-building through a number of different strategic options for leaders. Statecraft for peaceful change should include preventive diplomacy at the highest level. Soft balancing based on institutions and interdependence, at both the economic and societal levels, is useful under some conditions (Paul 2005; Paul, forthcoming).

Rising powers and established powers need better strategies to accommodate each other peacefully. Legitimacy is key to achieving higher international status without violence. How can rising powers obtain such legitimacy through institutional practices and normative innovations rather than resorting to brute force? Integrating rising powers peacefully through institutional mechanisms should form a focal point of status quo power diplomacy at the highest level. Soft balancing based on institutions and interdependence, at both the economic and societal levels, is useful under some conditions (Paul 2005; Paul, forthcoming).

Western Contributions

It should be noted that the Western countries have contributed considerably to peaceful change, although much of Western history is characterized by aggressive warfare and the pursuit of colonial and imperial dominance. It was the victory of certain strategic beliefs and myths that led to many European and colonial wars and the manner in which they were fought. However, it was European Enlightenment thinkers who brought to the world notions of liberty and equality grounded in reason. They were the ones who questioned the Hobbesian view, as well as religious superstitions, and presented alternative mechanisms enjoined in Lockeian and Kantian interpretations. Their key contribution was cosmopolitanism, which elevated societies from parochial worldviews and the elimination of ignorance by giving reason the highest value. Liberalism and Marxism as heirs to the Enlightenment project inherited the reason-based prescriptions for social change (Linklater 1998, 46). A fundamental assumption of Enlightenment has been that through the civilizing process states could shed violence. This linear worldview neglected the reverting to previous forms of violent existence under certain conditions (Vayrynen 2006, 5). Moreover, the Enlightenment also contributed to the so-called “scientific racism” of treating different societies in the global periphery as “uncivilized,” requiring European colonial tutelage and overlordship (Buzan and Lawson 2015), the remnants of which still persist today in certain parts of the world. Moreover, Enlightenment did not stop European powers from pursuing exaggerated grand strategies that led to foreign policy disasters and cataclysmic wars (Snyder 1991). A new enlightenment, rooted in peaceful co-existence and transformation, is the call of the day.

The Concert of Europe following the Napoleonic wars innovated conference diplomacy and collective security, which would later become the bedrock of the League of Nations and the United Nations. The Concert System is largely credited with the absence of great power war between 1815 and 1854 in Europe as leaders resorted to diplomacy to manage several crises that could have led to armed conflict (Elrod 1976). It was based on self-binding institutional restraints and built around a set of norms, principles, and ideas of legitimacy that privileged great powers as the custodians of international order, often at the expense of smaller powers and colonial territories. Thus, the Concert was based on an exclusionary understanding of international politics, which continues even today in the form of the UN Security Council and the G7. The anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles in many parts of the world in the twentieth century were indeed against Western exclusionism. The efforts at generating “constitutional peace” over “victor’s peace” have often produced outcomes that privileged the latter. The efforts at “institutionalized peace” are consequences of this tendency, but all assume external intervention to enforce peace (Richmond 2005, 50–51). The question is why the efforts at peaceful change failed and the world witnessed two cataclysmic wars. It may very well be that the non-application of peaceful strategies at crucial turning points generated these wars. While the resurrection of a Concert system is uncalled for, as it would legitimate inequality, great powers do have to take responsibility for their actions and avoid unnecessary conflict among themselves and in the regions where they are most active. This means the Concert’s idea of conference diplomacy with enlarged
participation would be given some prominence among established and rising powers.

Postwar Europe contributed more toward peaceful change by creating a pluralistic security community (Deutsch 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998). This community has indeed developed a grand strategy to avert war among members by relying on the pillars of liberal peace. But the Kantian progression in all dimensions is yet to take place. Kant’s third definitive article of peace based on cosmopolitan law, “the right of an alien not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another country” (Kant 1983, 118), is neglected in Europe as the peaceful integration of racial minorities has not been very successful. Europe is facing an unprecedented challenge to the Kantian ideals, as with globalization and mass migration, old social contracts have been upset in many countries and the absence of strong political leadership to protect the peaceful ideals puts the EU model under challenge. Kantian ideas offer much hope for Europe and the world, but they need further reinforcement and augmentation by leaders and the public.

Beyond the EU, Europe made some advancement toward peaceful change during the Cold War. Despite the intense conflict, the Helsinki Final Act baskets on cooperative security; economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation; and the promotion of human rights helped the creation of a change-seeking civil society on both sides, put pressure on Soviet and East European leaders to pursue alternate mechanisms than violent repressions for legitimacy, and supported economic rebuilding of Eastern Europe (Adler 1998, 127). The Helsinki process and the associated CSCE/OSCE institutions in which European states, along with their Eastern counterparts, have been credited for the Soviet acceptance of certain common norms and principles of international conduct. The institutionalized efforts might have thus helped end the Cold War relatively peacefully. But their ineffectiveness after the demise of the Cold War, especially in preventing the violent conflict in Yugoslavia, showed the weaknesses of European institutions. A new and effective mechanism similar to OSCE, instead of the West relying primarily on NATO for conflicts such as the one in Kosovo, probably would have prevented the resurrection of the rivalry between Russia and the West (Krickovic 2016). The biggest challenge for the European states today is how to maintain the institutional and normative bases of their separate peace and not to succumb to external and internal pressures to abandon peaceful mechanisms of change. Populist backlash against greater integration and control from Brussels and the resurgence of right-wing parties in many European states do not bode well for the EU’s future or the peaceful evolution of European order.

**US Contributions**

The UK accommodation of the United States as a great power during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was one of the rare examples of a peaceful rise of a great power without war. Explanations vary as to why the British accommodated the United States. Some argue that the UK was forced to accept Washington. Kupchan (2010, 73) contends that the rapprochement was initially caused by strategic necessity, while the subsequent strengthening occurred through sustained societal interactions producing a sense of cultural kinship. Zeren and Hall (2016) argue that this was partially a case of a militarily and economically strengthening America gatecrashing into the club, which a retreating Great Britain felt compelled to accommodate due to its inability to maintain a viable military presence in the Americas. The source of this accommodation is debatable, but it persisted and strengthened over time partially due to systemic competition involving common enemies such as Germany and later the USSR.

A key US-led attempt at peaceful change in the early twentieth century was Wilsonian internationalism based on institutions, that is, the League of Nations and its collective security system, the ideas of which lingered beyond the League’s demise. In the post–World War II period, the United States played a significant role in the creation of the United Nations, dismantling the European colonial order somewhat peacefully with partial support to the decolonization process. The use of the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of the war-ravaged Europe, and the rebuilding of Germany and Japan as peaceful nations, were major accomplishments. Cold War-era policies turned the goodwill into considerable suspicion and hostility in the emerging world. Restraint was missing in anti-Communist interventions, especially in Vietnam. Grand strategic myths played a big role in these US policy failures, especially in Vietnam (Brodie 1971).

During the transitions of the 1990s, the United States played a crucial role as a facilitator. Western leaders Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher, and George H. W. Bush showed prudence by not taking advantage of the Soviet Union at its moment of disintegration (Bush and Scowcroft 1998; Wohlfirth 2003). Subsequent US strategy has not been successful with respect to Russia, partially due to NATO expansion and failure of Western integration policies. Also, US policies have been substantial failures in the Middle East, where forceful regime changes since 2003 have ushered in a very violent phase, especially in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. A big question today is: Can the United States craft a strategy for peaceful change in the Middle East? More importantly: Can the United States accommodate a rising China and a resurgent Russia peacefully? What are the components of such an accommodation strategy? Can the United States and China peacefully resolve key issues such as Taiwan and South China Sea disputes? It is arguably better to accommodate China when the United States can frame the components of such a strategy. Once China gets too strong, the United States may no longer be able to accomplish the same goals easily. The big question is whether China is willing to be accommodated on US terms. Does it want to replace the United States as the lead power of the Pacific and substitute Pax Americana with Pax Sinica? Much depends on whether China desires to peacefully rise through institutional and economic means or wants to accelerate its growth through military means. The argument that China will never get there is also raised due to the current economic downturn. Cyclical economic decline, however, is no guarantee that a large geographical entity will abandon its quest for global power status, nor that a declining state will adopt other violent asymmetrical strategies to preserve its position, as is evident in Russia’s behavior today.

**Non-Western Ideas of Peaceful Change**

The IR discipline would benefit considerably by exploring ideas and strategies from non-Western countries that brought peaceful change in global, regional, and internal politics. Western scholarship tends to give little importance to the contributions other countries and civilizations have made for international relations, let alone peaceful change. These are least theorized in IR, and the
blame for this state of affairs goes to both the parochialism of Western IR and the inability of regional scholars to come up with groundbreaking theoretical works. The room for global IR is all the more critical today than ever before (Acharya 2016; Tickner and Blaney 2012; Behera 2008). Only rare IR works such as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) discuss the successes of some of the non-Western non-violent struggles.

In this context, I want to explore (as examples) a few ideas or policy frameworks that the so-called BRICS countries, comprise Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, have made toward peaceful change. All five have promoted the idea of “peaceful coexistence,” that includes mutual respect and sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, legal equality, and promotion of mutual benefits (De Coning, Mandrup, and Odgaard 2015), although at times they themselves have violated these norms. In addition, I will discuss briefly the contributions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for regional peace, as it is the most successful quasi-security community experiment in the developing world today. I do not claim that other countries or civilizations do not matter in generating ideas of peaceful change. The relatively peaceful Arab Spring, although now declined to violent and anti-democratic authoritarian modes in most countries, still offers lessons for spontaneous change and its consequences (Korany and El-Mahdi 2012; Almond 2012).

**Soviet Union/Russia:** The contributions of the Soviet Union and its somewhat peaceful dismantlement following the end of the Cold War need to be analyzed further. The Soviet participation in the Helsinki process helped ease the East-West tensions at various points. Soviet support for decolonization and its declaration of a non-first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons contained strategic elements of peaceful change. Nikita Khrushchev’s short-lived peaceful coexistence policy is yet another example. It should be noted that the strategies inherent in Glasnost and Perestroika produced far-reaching changes that the world had not seen in the four decades of the Cold War. Even though the sources of change can be partially attributed to external pressures (Deudney and Ikenberry 1991–1992), or normative ideas from outside (Checkel 1997), the strategy required conscious policy reorientation for peaceful adaptation. Gorbachev fundamentally altered Soviet foreign policy by adopting idealistic postures such as “global interdependence, universal human values, the balance of interests, and freedom of choice” (Larson and Shevchenko 2003, 77). These were not merely the result of the victory of Western ideological norms over the Soviet Union, but they “offered a new global mission that would enhance Soviet international status while preserving a distinctive national identity,” in order to compensate for its material weaknesses vis-à-vis the West (Larson and Shevchenko 2003, 78). Yet the Soviets also contributed to much violence by helping spread arms and supporting regimes and causes for their narrow national interests, including a failed military intervention in Afghanistan, the consequences of which are still ongoing. Obviously in today’s world, as Vladimir Putin is asserting his strength militarily around Russia’s neighborhood, there is considerable anxiety about where Moscow is heading.

**China:** China’s grand strategy in the past three decades offers interesting clues on peaceful change. Sun Tzu’s and Confucian ideas have influenced these strategies. Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* contains strategies for achieving one’s goals without using force. The exhortation of Sun Tzu that “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” is relevant here (Sun Tzu 2002, 48; Freedman 2013, 44). In the annals of strategies for peaceful change, Deng Xiaoping is a pivotal figure by way of his radical transformation of China through his great opening and modernization plans and exhorting the Chinese elite to pursue peaceful market-driven strategies for economic and social progress. His successor Hu Jintao’s policy of “peaceful rise,” later christened as “peaceful development,” stands out as an example of how a rising power can carve out its position without war. China is indeed one of the rare rising powers in history that crafted an explicit strategy for peaceful rise (Kang 2007; Wang 2010). The strategy of resurrecting the Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road and supporting developing countries through the creation of the New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) contains ideas for peaceful institutional bargaining with established powers, despite their nationalistic goals (He 2016). If China reaches global power status without a war, that will be a tremendous accomplishment to the idea of peaceful change, although the prospects are looking increasingly dim. What kind of normative and political order China wants to create after it reaches its power status is a big question yet to be answered. Future peaceful change involving other rising powers will be determined greatly by the Chinese strategy, as well as its attitude toward peaceful accommodation of those such as India that will follow.

**India:** India’s freedom struggle is a successful example of a peaceful strategy. It was Gandhi’s non-violent struggle that helped the liberation of India from colonialism and subsequently propelled the massive decolonization that took place in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world. Gandhian ideas were heavily influential in many countries’ internal struggles as well, notably the 1960s Martin Luther King, Jr.–led peaceful civil rights movement in the United States. Despite all its weaknesses, especially the rampant social and economic inequalities and occasional violence, India’s democratic constitution, based on fundamental rights, secularism, federalism, and the three-language formula, has done much to integrate and help peacefully change a country with an approximate population size of Africa and the Middle East combined (Nayar and Paul 2003; Cohen 2001; Basrur 2009). Independent India’s policy of non-alignment, beginning with the Bandung conference of 1955, support for disarmament, decolonization, and new international economic order, all had some impact on world-order discourses. The “panch-shila” or “five principles” of peaceful coexistence that India attempted to practice with China in the 1950s, although eventually failed, carried much resonance in India’s foreign policy approach during much of the Cold War era and beyond (Gupta and Chatterjee 2015). India has played the role of a norm entrepreneur, not always succeeding, and eventually abandoning the same ideas it preached, as in the case of nuclear disarmament. Yet India’s rise is occurring today somewhat peacefully. Most established powers, especially the United States, have accorded it a certain level of status (Paul and Shankar 2014) or partially accommodated it, and the country is viewed positively as a “link” or “bridging power” between the North and South (Sinha 2016).

**Brazil:** South America’s largest state, Brazil, has not pursued hegemonic aspirations in the military realm, even as it could have been the America of the region. Brazil’s attempt has not been to overthrow the existing international order but to reform it using soft power, especially through institutional bargaining (Mares 2016). Questions
remain as to whether Brazil’s focus on soft power, multilateralism, non-intervention, and nuclear-free zones has been due to conscious decisions or making a virtue out of necessity. Regional institution building and working for reforming global institutional structures have been other focal points of the Brazilian strategy (Hurrell 2010). Brazil in recent years has attempted “universalism” or dialogue with all states, non-ostracization of non-compliant states, and non-military intervention, thereby questioning the dominant approaches of the United States and its close allies in regional theaters. The concept of “agile interlocutor” has been practiced by the Brazilian governments in recent years (Abdenur 2015). The idea of a bridge builder between North and South, an “integrative,” “value-claiming actor,” is also aimed at improving Brazil’s relative position, becoming an indispensable actor in global governance without fundamentally challenging the international order (Burges 2013).

South Africa: South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress’s (ANC) conscious decision to forgive and forget and avoid ethnic purification as neighboring Zimbabwe did is an example of a strategy of peaceful change. The freedom struggle contained both violent and non-violent strategies. Post-Apartheid South Africa has not been all that successful in economic redistribution, but a democratic system is in place, however corrupt it might be. Also, Pretoria is not pushing to become the regional military hegemon in Africa, and has been contributing to conflict resolution in many African countries. South Africa’s diplomatic approach was enshrined in the 2011 Foreign Policy White Paper called “ubuntu,” which relies on “common humanity” instead of imposition of power, respect for all states and cultures, and gives prominence to human security (Mandrup and Smith 2015). Similarly, Pretoria is holding on to its anti-nuclear politics, helping maintain a nuclear-free zone in Africa. Both Brazil and South Africa show that muscling your way into dominance is not automatic. Rising powers such as India and Brazil have relied on soft power. China also depended on it, along with its hard power resources, for acquiring a higher global role and status. Their active participation and insertion into the globalized world economic order have facilitated this process.

ASEAN: At the regional level, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) stands out as a community that has created a separate peace at the interstate level based on institutional and normative means, as well as partial liberal ideas such as economic interdependence, despite most of the states in the grouping not being proper democracies and showing high levels of internal violence. The 10-member ASEAN, which emerged as a limited security community with its unique “ASEAN way” of cooperation, based on limited institutional engagement, has helped change state behavior through “socialization inside international institutions” and “persuasion,” as well as by providing “modes of behavior,” through “habits of cooperation” (Acharya 2008). Moreover, since 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with a membership of all ASEAN member states, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, both Koreas, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and the United States, has emerged as a major venue to discuss regional security issues such as the relationship among the major powers, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, transnational crime, and conflicts in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. The ARF annual meetings have offered an important venue for these states to engage their neighbors and major power actors diplomatically, especially the rising China. ASEAN has been reasonably successful in the areas of confidence building and the exchange of information on military doctrines, arms acquisitions, and military exercises. However, strong notions of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and the presence of non-democratic or quasi-democratic states prevent ASEAN from emerging as a true pluralistic security community.

Why Do Countries Change from Peaceful to Violent Strategies?

It is interesting to examine why countries after pursuing initial peaceful strategies turn toward violent strategies. Standard realist responses are inadequate to answer this question. One might say that relative material weakness may be the reason for adopting such benign strategies. But it is not clear that materially stronger powers inevitably adopt violent strategies.

The Soviet decline contributed to peace at the great power level, and conflict resolution in many regions of the world, but it generated domestic forces that did not see any benefits coming to Russia. Western non-recognition of Russia’s aspirations for higher status, including non-fulfillment of verbal commitments of non-expansion of NATO, may be a major reason for the disillusionment. In 2014 Russian leader Vladimir Putin initiated a major military involvement in Ukraine by reconquering Crimea and supporting violent secessionist groups in Eastern Ukraine. He has also resumed Russian military buildup, generating threatening policies in the Baltic, Balkan, and East European states formerly in the Soviet camp. An arms race with the West and a military doctrine that now considers war with the West as a possibility are signs of grand strategy reorientation with potential for violent conflict in the future.

In the Chinese case, the arrival of Xi Jinping in 2012 with his regime’s aggressive push for territory in the South China Sea has been threatening what was accomplished using the “peaceful rise strategy” of Deng, Hu Jin Tao, and followers. The “salami slicing” of the South China Sea and the rapid militarization of the region have the potential to upset the peaceful rise strategy in the years to come. However, the strategy of resurrecting the Maritime Silk Road, supporting developing countries’ economies, and infrastructure development, especially in Africa, strategies have blemishes and yet are distinct from the Western strategy in these regions. The “One Belt One Road” strategy, relying on resurrecting the historic connectivity between China and Eurasia of the land- and sea-based silk roads, has the potential for turning to peaceful development or military competition (McKinsey and Company 2016). The creation of new institutions, BRICS, BRICS Bank, Asian Infrastructure Bank, and other developmental assistance policies may generate interdependence and limited peace as long as they are not used for increasing competition with other big powers.

In the Indian case, the failures of Nehru’s neighborhood policy, especially after the 1962 China War, led to a rethinking of the earlier focus on low military spending and active international participation for norms change through diplomacy. The “Look East” (initiated by former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao) and “Act East” (renamed by current Prime Minister Narendra Modi) policies have both peaceful and potentially conflictual possibilities as India gets enmeshed in East Asia’s geopolitical fault lines. The strategy today is driven by a peaceful rise approach.
using economic and institutional means, although internal violence and increasing religious intolerance are threatening that process (Paul and Shankar 2014). The inability to settle two lingering border conflicts has cast a shadow on India’s claim for peaceful change in the region and beyond.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, both Brazil and South Africa are holding on to non-hegemonic strategies, non-nuclear policies, and support for regional institutions. But weak economic growth and high levels of inequality in both countries may produce more violence and turbulence in the years ahead. Even regional groupings such as ASEAN are vulnerable to discord and potential disintegration, as it has been unable to face the pressure of China’s not-so-peaceful rise in recent years. Consensus has been eluding ASEAN at its annual meetings in recent years on the question of strategy toward China’s aggressive push in the South China Sea.

The first three cases demonstrate that countries can initiate strategies of peaceful change, but they need not sustain them. Their experiences show that our attention needs to be focused on not only achieving peaceful change but also on how to sustain it, similar to peace-building in war-torn societies. A number of questions arise from this discussion. What institutional and normative changes can be built that will sustain peaceful change in the long run? Can democracy as a precedent for peaceful change in domestic societies be implemented at the global level? What are the similarities and dissimilarities? In-depth historical case studies are useful to explore the general conditions under which states abandon peaceful strategies after practicing them for a period. Why did the Concert of Europe not last? Why did Germany abandon Bismarckian policies of peaceful rise? Why did inter-war Japan end up adopting aggressive policies? Why was Germany after World War I not pacified through peaceful means? What strategic responses by status quo powers would have prevented the violent challenges of Germany and Japan in the 1930s? What new strategies can prevent an emerging power transition conflict involving the United States vis-à-vis China and Russia?

What are the elements of grand strategy that can effectively bring about peaceful change? What strategies can sustain it? Ignoring power politics is a mistake. But balance of power and deterrence are not the sole, nor the only dependable, answers today, as balances can be broken through clever asymmetric strategies. Ignoring institutional and liberal norms and ideas is also unwise. How do we combine them in an effective statecraft for change without war? Can IR become the leading source of ideas for peaceful change, or are we going to adopt. And non-Western ideas are ignored in the West and in the Western-dominated IR discipline. As we have seen, some non-Western states have contributed, in their own distinctive ways, much to the ideas of peaceful transformation. The IR discipline and the policy world need to pay attention to good ideas on peace and peaceful change—wherever they come from—in order to help create a better world order in the years to come.

Conclusions: The Need for Statecraft for Peaceful Change

We need to recast grand strategy in view of the major changes taking place in world politics. The strategic ideas deriving from historic European, as well as Cold War-era, experiences are insufficient to face contemporary security challenges and to obtain security and prosperity for states on a sustainable basis. This is especially true for great powers. The excessive focus on war fighting, especially in the nuclear age, would, if war breaks out, likely cause irreparable havoc to both established and rising powers. Thus, grand strategies of peaceful change are in the rational interests of all great powers—whether rising or established. The article also highlighted peaceful strategies inherent in Western, American, Russian, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, and South African in addition to ASEAN countries’ past and present-day policies. A common theme among all of them is peaceful coexistence. Institutions also appear as a major arena for peace, as in the ASEAN case. Sustained mutual engagement and normative change in relation to the Soviet bloc came out through the CSCE/OSCE process in Europe. China’s strategy of “peaceful rise” represents the most recent grand-strategic innovation by a rising power. The near-abandonment of this strategy by the current leadership in Beijing is already generating much tension in the Asia-Pacific area today. If states—and especially the United States and China—fail to develop and implement grand strategies of peaceful change, the next generation will suffer grave consequences. The IR discipline needs to rise to the occasion. Most of the major perspectives in IR provide several strategies for peaceful change, particularly classical and neoclassical realism, liberalism, and constructivism. However, their ideas are not synthesized or presented in useful forms for policymakers to adopt. And non-Western ideas are ignored in the West and in the Western-dominated IR discipline. As we have seen, some non-Western states have contributed, in their own distinctive ways, much to the ideas of peaceful transformation. The IR discipline and the policy world need to pay attention to good ideas on peace and peaceful change—wherever they come from—in order to help create a better world order in the years to come.

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